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A small proportion of American charitable donors give to international causes. Aid to developing 
countries constitutes a large part of this charitable sector. By studying donors who make 
contributions to causes outside the US, we may better understand the factors which shape public 
concern for global poverty and inequality, and which influence the will for redistribution. While 
a substantial amount of research has investigated the determinants of overall giving in the US, 
little is known about the determinants of giving to specific causes, especially international 
causes. With the data set, “Giving and Volunteering in the United States 2001,” this study uses 
econometric regression analysis to estimate the predictors of giving to international causes and 
compares them to the determinants of giving to other causes such as health, education and the 
arts. My main hypothesis is that educational and religious institutions influence people to 
identify with and donate to individuals and causes in the developing world. This is based on the 
theory in altruism studies that people behave prosocially when they identify others’ interests as 
indistinct from their own. The results of econometric analysis support the idea that education and 
religiosity are significant predictors of giving to international causes, but suggest that other 
mechanisms are more influential. Of the predictors included in the regression model, youth 
volunteering has the largest effect on the likelihood that someone gives internationally, both 
compared to other predictors in the model, and compared to the effect of youth volunteering on 
giving to other causes. The size and significance of the effect of each variable vary by cause, 
confirming that there are unique determinants for giving to different charitable sectors. For 
giving to international causes, the results suggest that being foreign born, having volunteered in 
one’s youth, belonging to a non-religious group, attending religious services frequently and 
having a four-year college degree or more are all significant factors. These variables may 
represent mechanisms for identification, as well as other factors that motivate charitable giving 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Private Charitable Giving  
Charitable giving by Americans is a powerful force shaped by individual, social, economic, 
and political factors. According to “Giving USA 2009,” an annual publication by the Center 
on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Americans gave privately a record-breaking $307 
billion to charity in 2008. However, adjusted for inflation, the figure shows a two percent 
decrease in donations compared to 2007, an unsurprising finding given the recent economic 
recession. As 75 percent of private donations were made by individuals (with corporations, 
foundations, and charitable bequests providing the remaining support) the factors associated 
with recession evidently affect individuals’ charitable budgets.  
 
 
Yet not all philanthropic sectors saw reduced donations in 2008. While charities supporting 
the arts, education, the environment, health, human services and community foundations 
experienced a decline in private funding in 2008, support for non-profit organizations in the 
religious, public-societal benefit, and international sectors grew (Giving USA 2009)1. Thus, 
there may be distinct factors - connected to, or regardless of, economic conditions - which 
influence people to give to certain types of organizations. The purpose of this study is to 
identify the factors which shape an individual’s preference for giving to international causes, 
specifically to international charities which address poverty and inequality in the ‘developing 
world.’  
 
Private Giving to International Development 
The category “international causes” implies a broad range of charitable organizations. 
However, Kerlin and Reid (2006) find that the majority of international donations belong 
specifically to the category “development and assistance” - 73 percent of the 5,600 
international organizations they study and 89 percent of total international donations are 
designated for programs in the developing world. The remainder of organizations and 
                                                          
1 Public-societal benefit refers to combined funds like the United Way, policy institutions, social-science 
research and social advocacy organizations (Giving USA 2008). The international category includes “relief, 




donations are shared between two other subcategories: “international understanding” 
(including study abroad programs) and “international affairs” (national political interests)2.   
 
Taken together, international non-profit organizations in all three areas comprise a growing 
charitable sector. Still, total donations remain relatively small compared to other areas of 
giving such as education, health, religion, and public-societal benefit. In 2000, total donations 
to international causes were just over one percent of the total private donations in the US, the 
smallest of all sectors (Giving USA 2001). By 2008, that proportion had grown to four 
percent, but only outranked giving to the environment (Giving USA 2009). Essentially, 
Americans are much more likely to give to domestic than international causes. Put another 
way, Americans give more to education (or health, or public-societal benefit) in the US alone, 
than to education, health, and public-societal benefit in all other countries combined3.   
 
The typical American donor’s preference for domestic charity is not surprising. Donors may 
more readily understand and feel equipped to address local needs. A nearby Boys and Girls 
Club is more familiar than a latrine-building project in El Salvador, for example. Donors may 
also be influenced by the personal benefits of their local donations. Supporting an after school 
program at the Boys and Girls Club might garner a donor praise from the community for 
being a good neighbor and decrease the number of unsupervised teenagers on the streets. The 
rewards for funding new latrines in a remote area of El Salvador are less conspicuous.  
 
However, as states have rolled back provisions in the last three decades - and as globalization 
has made neighbors out of former strangers - individuals in the ‘developed’ world have taken 
on more responsibility for funding poverty reduction and economic growth in the developing 
world. Indeed, international philanthropy is growing in America (Okten and Osili 2007; 
Hudson Institute 2008).  
 
                                                          
2 Throughout this dissertation, I use the terms “international charities, organizations and causes” interchangeably 
to refer to the international charitable sub-sector, taken as a whole. As Kerlin and Reid (2006) suggest, the 
majority of organizations comprising this sub-sector are oriented toward development and assistance, but I only 
use the term “international development” to refer specifically to donations designated for programs in the 
developing world.  
3 Private donations reflect - and perhaps even shape - the government's spending priorities: total US Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) ranks at the top of countries belonging to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), but in terms of the budget percentage for assistance, the US ranks above 




What can we learn about the small, yet growing number of Americans who give to 
international charities? Discerning the factors which influence them to give is a potentially 
gainful endeavor, not only for fundraisers in the international sector (Rose-Ackerman 1996), 
but for anyone interested in predicting the effects of economic crises, tax policies and changes 
in the government’s international aid budget on private donations. Furthermore, we might also 
better understand how some individuals come to conceptually and behaviorally support global 
redistribution. Atkinson (2007: 1) makes the astute observation that giving to international 
charity “is one of the few direct ways in which individuals reveal information relevant to the 
properties of the social welfare function to be applied to global redistribution.” Many 
Americans may agree that global poverty and inequality are problematic. Some may act on 
their concern by voting for politicians who espouse similar convictions or by purchasing fair-
trade goods. Few choose to donate some of their own money to relevant international 
charitable organizations4.  
  
Is Private Charity Helpful 
While it may be safe to say categorically that the will for international redistribution is a good 
thing, private aid as the medium for redistribution is problematic in many regards.  Not only is 
it insufficient to substantively fight global poverty and inequality, but in general, private aid is 
by no means inherently more capable than public aid of addressing global disparity and its 
consequences. Difficulties with public aid - formally called “Official Development 
Assistance” - such as rent-seeking, bureaucratic inefficiency, and conditionality, translate to 
high transfer costs and more conditionality in the private sector. Furthermore, the vast number 
of donors and the multitude of international non-governmental organizations lead to a 
confusing and potentially counter-productive nebula of donor agendas. Scholte (2003) notes 
that when uninformed donors support popular initiatives like “adopt a child” programs in 
developing countries, they may unknowingly increase inequality within recipient 
communities.  
 
The Purpose of this Study 
Informed and helpful or not, private donors to international causes provide a significant 
source of assistance to developing countries. The purpose of this study is to learn about the 
                                                          
4 Granted, donors may itemize their gifts on tax returns to receive tax breaks and decrease the cost of giving. 




donor base for international causes. By analyzing the impact of factors - such as gender, age, 
education, religion, and income - on the probability of giving, I attempt to identify what leads 
people to be concerned about and committed to global issues compared to other causes. In 
popular discourse, the typical explanation is limited to income: most Americans are internally 
focused and choose to spend their limited resources domestically, while the rich and/or 
famous can afford what is considered in the US to be the luxury of giving to international 
causes. The high visibility of donors like Bill and Melinda Gates, Warren Buffet, Oprah 
Winfrey, Ted Turner, Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt may skew perceptions about the 
determinants of giving internationally. But what about the non-celebrity or less-wealthy 
Americans who choose to give to international causes? Do they have a unique set of 
characteristics compared to those who give only to domestic causes?  
 
Common sense provides some rather obvious answers. People who have traveled or have 
lived outside the US - especially in places where they might have seen great suffering and 
need - may be more inclined to give to international causes. People who pay attention to 
world news reports and who read articles and books on various related topics are more 
informed on global issues, and therefore may be more committed to help. Conversely, the 
more informed people are, the less confident they may be that they can help.  
 
Study Design and Main Hypotheses 
To explore these ideas and enrich the conversation, in this dissertation I explore the 
determinants of giving to international causes compared to other causes in the US, drawing on 
the large body of literature that has examined the determinants of giving in the US and 
elsewhere. For these purposes, I employ the data set “Giving and Volunteering in the United 
States 2001,” produced by the Independent Sector, a private, non-partisan coalition of 
charitable organizations in the US and leader in philanthropic research, based in Washington, 
DC. The data consists of a wide and relevant range of demographic, attitudinal and behavioral 
variables collected with the intent purpose of studying philanthropy among American 
individuals. I make use of both descriptive and econometric techniques to explore the 
question, “who gives to international charities compared to other causes?” My hypothesis is 




Americans. In particular, I am interested in the effect of education and religion on the 
probability of giving internationally.  
 
Research shows that in the US, religious affiliation and practice significantly impact giving 
more generally (see Bekkers and Wiepking 2007 for a review of the literature). But how does 
religiosity affect giving to different causes such as international development5? The last two 
decades have seen a growing concern and solidarity among religious bodies to address global 
poverty and inequality; the Jubilee 2000 initiative for debt cancellation in developing 
countries and the ONE campaign against extreme poverty are well-known examples. In 2005, 
the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops organized The Catholic Campaign Against 
Global Poverty to support effective US trade policies, long-term development programs, and 
debt cancellations for poor countries (Catholic Relief Services 2009). In 2006, at the triennial 
General Convention of the Episcopal Church, USA, delegates made the Millennium 
Development Goals the national church’s top mission priority for the 2006-2009 cycle 
(Episcopal Relief and Development 2009). To garner support for these and other initiatives, 
local religious communities may preach messages, employ curricula for weekly religious 
classes, and host fundraisers that explicitly encourage members to consider themselves as 
agents of charity recipients’ physical and perhaps even spiritual well-being6. As a result of 
their faith-based commitment to serving people ‘in need,’ are religious Americans more likely 
to give to developing countries where poverty is deepest and need is greatest?  Does 
religiosity affect international giving more or differently than it does other causes? 
 
Research also shows that education positively impacts charitable giving, even after 
controlling for the effect of other variables (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). But how does 
education affect giving to different causes? Four-year degree programs often require students 
to take survey courses in history, politics, economics, and sociology which may bring global 
disparities to students’ attention, or which may simply expand their frame of reference. 
Undergraduate and graduate degrees in a variety of fields necessarily include international 
                                                          
5 By “religiosity,” I mean a person’s level of religiousness, or the degree to which they practice their faith by 
attending religious services.  
6 Some small-scale examples of consciousness- and fund-raising include Heifer International’s “Ark” project 
which supplies pairs of domesticated animals to communities in developing countries - a play off of the Old 
Testament story, Noah’s Ark, and therefore an appeal to communities in the Judeo-Christian tradition (Heifer 
International 2009). Similarly, Darfur awareness campaigns within Muslim communities have created 




studies. Certain fields may increase students’ appreciation of the interdependence of global 
economies. Generally, the more educated people are, the more likely they may be to read the 
newspaper, to listen to National Public Radio, or to read complex articles in periodicals which 
expose them to issues outside the US. Are well-educated Americans - who are likely to be 
more knowledgeable about global politics and economics - also more likely than the less-
educated to give to international charities that support development? Generally, do education 
and religiosity shape the values and perceptions that compel individuals to support one cause 
over another?  
 
The Determinants of International Giving: What is Known 
There is an extensive literature on the determinants of charitable giving, in the United States 
especially. Research has tested the effect of numerous variables on the likelihood that people 
give. A common theme is that “social identity is an important determinant of philanthropy”  
(Berger 2006: 131). Social participation is commonly found to influence charitable behavior 
(Havens and Schervish 1997; Putnam 2000; Brown 2001). Yet while there has been 
considerable research on the determinants of charitable giving to all causes taken together, 
and although data are kept on the incidence and size of donations to different causes, there has 
been little inquiry into who gives to each cause (Atkinson 2007; Micklewright and Schnepf 
2007; Okten and Osili 2007). The consequence is a dearth of knowledge about American 
donor bases for particular causes, including international charity.  
 
The topic has recently garnered more attention in the United Kingdom. In conjunction with 
the Economic and Social Research Council, researchers at the Southampton Statistical 
Sciences Research Institute (S3RI) and Oxford University are currently performing 
descriptive and econometric analysis on ‘Giving to Overseas Causes’ in the UK (see 
Micklewright and Wright 2005; Atkinson 2007; Atkinson and Eastwood 2007; Piper and 
Schnepf 2007). Micklewright and Schnepf (2007) report, for instance, that increases in 
income lead to statistically similar increases in donations to domestic and international 
causes, but that education has a larger effect on international, rather than domestic, giving.  
 
Such findings are not necessarily true of international charity in the US: Micklewright and 




there are country-specific determinants for Official Development Assistance (such as geo-
political strategic considerations (Alesina and Dollar 2000)), there may be unique 
determinants for private giving to international charities by individuals in the US. Compared 
to the British, fewer Americans give a smaller percentage of their charitable budgets to 
international causes. These uncommon donors may exhibit unique characteristics. In a 
working paper for the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Okten and Osili (2007) 
use econometric analysis to identify the determinants of private support for international aid 
by US citizens who express their concern by making charitable donations and/or by being in 
favor of government assistance. They find that income and education are significant 
predictors of support for international causes. Their study is original in its intent to examine 
American determinants of international aid. To my knowledge, it remains the only existing 
econometric analysis on the topic. Although similar in its intent to identify the determinants 
of international charity, this study utilizes different means to different ends. Essentially, the 
data set I use uniquely equips me to compare the effect of a wide range of determinants on 
private giving to international charities versus a number of domestic causes7.  
 
An Outline of this Study  
The dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter Two, I review both the theoretical and 
empirical literature which ask “why do people give to charity” and “who gives to charity.” 
Chapter Three presents the methodology - my approach to the research question as it is 
informed by the literature and the available data, as well as the methods I use in descriptive 
and econometric analysis. The results of the analysis and a discussion of the findings are 
provided in Chapter Four. Chapter Five concludes with overall observations and some 
suggestions for future research. 
                                                          
7  More specifically, to compare the determinants of private giving to international versus domestic causes, I 
choose the Giving and Volunteering data set for its specified inquiry into charitable behavior, for its breadth of 
related variables and charitable causes. Okten and Osili (2007) analyze the 2001 and 2003 waves of the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for its detailed information on wealth and the Generalized Social Survey for 
its variable on ideological support for government assistance. These data sets are well-tailored to their research 
purpose, to asses American’s ‘preferences for redistribution’ vis-a-vis private and/or public assistance to 
developing countries. For my research purposes, the Giving and Volunteering data set provides more suitable 
distinctions based on the formal charitable sectors to which people give. One important difference between the 
PSID and Giving and Volunteering data sets is that the PSID classifies donations to help the needy meet their 
basic needs and to international aid or peace as two separate charitable causes (Wilhelm 2006), a distinction that 
would confound my analysis of the factors which influence donors to identify with and give to people in need in 
the developing world, versus other causes. Furthermore, while Okten and Osili make no reference to religion in 
their written analysis, and apparently include only one dummy variable for “Catholic” in their regression 




Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
 
There are many reasons why people help others: to feel good about themselves, achieve social 
status, obey social norms, reduce the negative consequences to themselves of others’ 
suffering, secure some kind of return, fulfill religious beliefs, work toward secular principles 
like justice, and increase others’ welfare. Intuitively one knows that prosocial behavior - 
meaning any action commonly considered as favorable, helpful, and encouraging of social 
cohesion - usually results from a complex interplay of these factors.         
 
Charitable giving is but one type of prosocial behavior, and thus may be motivated by 
somewhat distinct factors. An individual gives money for a different mix of reasons than 
those that motivate her to volunteer at a soup kitchen, for instance, or perform 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on a stranger. Variation exists across individuals as 
well: some people are more likely to give money to an international non-governmental 
organization (NGO), others to go on a “mission trip” to a developing country. Bekkers and 
Wiepking (2007) note an important difference between charitable giving and other kinds of 
helping behavior: namely, that the beneficiary and benefactor may never meet. Lacking the 
motivational immediacy of face-to-face interactions, charitable giving is presumably 
influenced by other factors8. Because geographic and cultural distance further separate 
participants in international exchange, there may be especially distinct factors involved.  
 
This chapter reviews the literature supporting the idea that there are unique determinants for 
giving, and to international causes in particular. In their literature review on the determinants 
of charitable giving, Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) make a methodological distinction 
between two types of research: cross-sectional data reveal “who gives what” and experimental 
data explore “why people give.” Although I focus my secondary analysis on cross-sectional 
data to ask “who gives to international causes,” I review literature asking both questions to 
build my hypothesis that Americans who give internationally may be uniquely influenced by 
educational and religious institutions which encourage them to identify with citizens in 
                                                          
8 Although another obvious difference is that it may be less physically and emotionally taxing to write a check 
than to volunteer, there are still a set of factors that distinguish givers from non-givers which are presumably 




developing countries. In the first half of the review, I explore the literature which attempts to 
answer “why” people give. Because the literature on altruism is extensive, I rely on a few 
comprehensive reviews, going into more depth where theories have potentially unique 
explanatory power for giving to international causes. In the second half, I review the 
empirical literature that explores “who gives.” Here, too, I draw from the broad literature on 
the determinants of giving to provide particular context for my research on international 
giving.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Literature Review 
 
Egoism and Altruism  
Why would an American give her money to an organization that benefits homeless children in 
Brazil? Is it because she is a good person who cares selflessly for children, or because she 
wants to be known among her peers as a world-wise altruist? While the particular mix of 
factors which produce charitable giving to international programs may differ from those 
producing other kinds of prosocial behavior, the underlying forces may be similar: people 
care about others and helping has its own rewards.   
 
The long list of prosocial motivations at the beginning of this chapter has historically been 
reduced to fit a conceptual frame consisting of two opposing forces, altruism and self-interest. 
Based on rational choice theory, the model assumes the primacy of an individual’s utility 
function: people are naturally motivated and equipped to maximize their personal gain (Wang 
and Graddy 2008). As a result, most prosocial behavior can be ultimately understood as an 
investment in one’s own interests. However, acts that do not appear self-interested have long 
perplexed theorists, leading notable economists like Smith, Bentham and Mill to conclude that 
humans have a dual nature (Monroe 1994)9. Occasionally and perhaps inexplicably, people 
behave altruistically with no apparent personal gain. Definitions vary, but altruistic behavior 
is always understood as incurring more cost than providing benefit to the helper, and is 
therefore distinct from self-interest.   
                                                          
9 Smith wrote: “how selfish soever man be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which 
interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from 
it, except the pleasure of seeing it” (from Theory of Moral Sentiments in Piliavin and Charng 1990: 27). Today, 
this apparent behavioral inconsistency is called the ‘‘collective good problem’’ or the ‘‘participation paradox’’ 




   
The Mixed Model 
Although the competing forces model has a certain metaphysical appeal, it does not lend to 
systematic exploration of prosocial motivations; it is difficult to investigate and predict 
behavior that swings dramatically back and forth between instinctual self-preservation and 
transcendental self-sacrifice. Frustrated by the lack of analytical precision, Becker (1976: 817) 
quipped that in economics, altruism is typically “explained by human nature or an equivalent 
evasion of the problem.” More recently, the egoism/altruism model has been fitted to a 
continuum with selfishness and selflessness at the extreme poles, and “impure altruism” in 
between (Andreoni 1990). The widely accepted idea is that prosocial behavior results from a 
complex mix of self- and other-oriented motivations (Monroe 1994; Piliavin and Charng 
1990). A North American may give money for flu vaccinations in Mexico because he 1) is 
selflessly concerned for Mexicans’ well-being or 2) selfishly wants to decrease the chance 
that the flu spreads. The more likely story, however, is that he is motivated by both these 
factors and others.  In other words, he is an impure altruist. Common sense and research 
confirm that the “mixed model...is consistent with observed patterns of giving” (Andreoni 
1990: 465).  
 
Despite the mixed model’s plausibility, some have attempted to completely demythologize 
altruism by arguing that all behavior is inherently motivated by self-interest. The following 
sections outline single and mixed-model explanations of prosocial behavior posed by 
economists, psychologists, and sociobiologists.  
 
Economics 
The potential benefits to one who performs an apparently “selfless” act are numerous. As 
economists have refined utility function theories, expanded them to include social and 
psychological factors, and invalidated moralistic connotations, they have recast altruism as a 
rational modification of self-interest - not an exception to it (Monroe 1994). French politician 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous phrase “self-interest, rightly understood” describes the 
“enlightened” way in which Americans achieve their ends by forming voluntary associations 




an act looks altruistic, the rational agent has actually managed to satisfy her own preferences 
and priorities, which include the pleasure she receives from helping.    
 
Other theoretical approaches to altruism do not deny the possibility that people put others’ 
interests ahead of their own, but simply reject the idea that prosocial behavior can be 
motivated by selflessness alone. Concerning charitable giving, economists explore the 
theoretical crowding-out effect of government funding on donations. If, for instance, donors 
give to international development agencies solely to meet recipients’ needs, then for every 
dollar more that the government gives, informed donors should give a dollar less. As long as 
the goods are provided, the “pure altruist” does not care who provides them10. Research finds, 
however, that crowding out is far from perfect, and usually rather small (Piliavin and Charng 
1990, Rose-Ackerman 1996, Ribar and Wilhelm 2002). Donors are not indifferent to who 
gives. They get something out of giving, something more than the dispassionate, disinterested 
knowledge that others’ needs are being met.    
 
Provided a choice between giving directly or indirectly through taxes, do Americans prefer to 
experience the gratification associated with direct giving? To explore this question, Ribar and 
Wilhelm (2002) analyze panel data from 1986 to 1992 on the relationship between public and 
private aid for international relief and development. They focus on international aid because 
the public goods provided by international donations are not available to donors for 
consumption as are those provided by donations to local causes11. Therefore, they are able to 
isolate material motivations, and to explore the “warm-glow” theory that people give because 
it makes them feel good. The results show small crowding-out effects, robust to different 
levels of donor-awareness about government spending, and thus suggest that international 
donors are indeed impure altruists who enjoy the act of giving. They do not deny the 
                                                          
10 It is confusing that the “pure altruist” is also the free rider, that people who experience the so-called “joy-of-
giving” are impure altruists (Rose-Ackerman 1996). The contradictory moralistic connotations of these and other 
concepts confound any in-depth study of altruism. For example, Henkel and Stirrat (1997) argue that when a gift 
is completely free and disinterested (altruistic) - when it denies reciprocity - it is paternalistic. The gift is 
considered both pure and immoral because in this society, religion, politics, and the economy are “each ruled by 
[their] own morality” (Henkel and Stirrat 1997: 71). With self-interest lauded as the appropriate orientation in 
the economic realm, and self-sacrifice in the religious, it is unsurprising that we speak so unintelligibly about 
‘the right thing to do.’ Nor is it surprising that prosocial motivations are so elusive. Particularly in the US, where 
Judeo-Christian and capitalist values co-exist in a similarly conflicting relationship, it is difficult to tease out the 
mechanisms underlying charitable behavior. Research participants may not know or may not give detailed 
information about why they give.  




possibility that dispassionate altruism plays a role in giving, but are confident that, due to 
impure motivations, moderate increases in government assistance will not lead to proportional 
losses in private donations.  
 
Psychology 
Psychologists also argue that what appears to be altruistic is actually prompted by self-serving 
motives. For example, when individuals refuse to participate in activities promoted by peers 
such as volunteering, they risk ostracism. Hence, such acts are not voluntary (Rapaport 1995).  
Developmental psychology poses that, as infants, people learn to be happy when others are 
happy and sad when others are sad because we depend on others for our survival (Marwell 
1982 in Piliavin and Charng 1990). In effect, we learn to empathize. We are further compelled 
to help because people treat us poorly when they are upset, whether or not we are the cause 
(ibid). Thus, people help to reduce their “aversive arousal” to others’ suffering (Batson and 
Shaw 1991: 114).   
 
Does the threat of terrorism - a potential negative externality of poverty and inequality - lead 
Americans to give to international relief and development agencies? Batson and Shaw (1991) 
argue that the aversive-arousal explanation is less predictive than the empathy-altruism 
model; unless we are directly exposed to dramatic suffering and its potential consequences, 
there may not be enough stimulus to compel reflexive action. However, because we are 
socialized to empathically take on others’ perspectives, we are compelled to act by our own 
reaction. Thus, an American woman may give to an international development agency 
because she empathizes with the Bolivian mother of a malnourished child.   
 
Sociobiology 
If preconditions for empathy develop in infancy, then it is not a transcendental virtue, but an 
evolutionary survival strategy. Likewise, altruism may not be a surrender of self-interest, but 
a biologically competitive application of it (Becker 1976). Sociobiologists explain that while 
self-interest is an effective orientation between individuals, group-interest is more competitive 
between groups (Monroe 1994). Essentially, a group has a better chance of reproducing itself 




people who behave ‘altruistically’ may receive social rewards that outweigh the cost of 
sacrifice.    
 
It is difficult to find an application of sociobiological theories for giving to international 
development, unless we 1) return to the negative externality explanation that by “fighting 
global poverty and inequality” with donations, Americans increase their own chances for 
survival or 2) expand the group size to the total world population, suggesting that donors 
instinctively perceive a collective battle against poverty and inequality. It seems more likely, 
however, that altruism as an innate biological mechanism (Piliavin and Charng 1990) is 
expressed in smaller groups where individuals have an almost reflexive response to the needs 
of people they know.   
 
What, then, constitutes the motivation for international philanthropy, for giving to distant 
strangers? Undoubtedly, some donors to international causes have either traveled to or were 
born outside the US. But what about those who, in effect, give to complete strangers? 
Although making sacrifices within one’s group may be a survival strategy of the fittest, it is 
unlikely that those who give outside of their group are less intelligent, adaptive, or successful 
than people who give domestically.  
 
Paradigm Shift: Identification Theory 
Despite the sophisticated development of the altruism/egoism model over time, theories based 
on the “primacy of self-interest” - even as it operates in a group - do not fully explain all 
kinds of helping behavior (Monroe 1994; Rose-Ackerman 1996). Havens and Schervish 
(1997) suggest an alternate approach: research should explore the extent to which people 
identify their interests as indistinct from others’ interests. The conceptual shift is subtle but 
significant: if people who exhibit prosocial behavior do not perceive a clear separation 
between their own and others’ interests, then the model which explains their motivation 
should not assume entirely separate utility functions12. Becker (1976) paves the way for 
identification theory with his “rotten kid theorem” that individuals in a family (in any 
relationship of exchange) behave benevolently towards other family members because their 
                                                          
12 Of course, this way of thinking is not new: Edgeworth wrote in 1881 that “between the frozen pole of egoism 
and the tropical expanse of utilitarianism [there is] the position of one for whom in a calm moment his 
neighbour’s utility compared with his own neither counts for nothing, nor ‘counts for one’, but counts for a 




utility is ultimately co-determined. Behavior that gives the impression of individual self-
interest or sacrifice is actually motivated by “mutual self interest’ or “multi-person altruism” 
(Havens and Schervish 1997: 237).  
  
Batson and Shaw (1991) emphasize that the conceptualization of mutual self-interest has 
occurred alongside developments in the broader scientific community that people are social 
beings. Empirical research in the US accordingly indicates that social capital is an important 
predictor of charitable giving (Piliavin and Charng 1990; Havens and Schervish 1997; Putnam 
2000; Brown 2001; Berger 2006). In particular, the voluntary associations and religious 
communities in which people participate influence how they spend their money (Rose-
Ackerman 1996)13.  By actively participating in the lives of others, people are more likely to 
perceive their interests as interdependent. Havens and Schervish (1997: 240) describe 
“communities of participation” as “necessary engagement points for altruism” and Batson and 
Shaw (1991) use the language of “attachment” to describe the identification which occurs in 
these settings.  
  
The concept of identification is an especially useful tool to explore the determinants of giving 
to different charitable causes. While all givers may be motivated by a mixture of self- and 
other-serving reasons, they give to different causes because they identify with them in largely 
distinct ways: a cancer survivor gives to a health-related organization, an avid hiker to the 
environment, and a former Peace Corps volunteer to international development. Naturally, 
people are more likely to identify with the individuals, groups and causes with which they 
come into contact. Therefore it is unsurprising that international causes receive a considerably 
smaller portion of private donations than domestic causes14.   
  
For the relative minority of donors who do give internationally, what leads them to identify? 
Monroe (1994) proposes that cognitive factors such as identity, self-perception, world view, 
and empathy can lead to identification. In a globalizing world where images of and 
                                                          
13 Sudgen explains that, within participatory groups, people are compelled to give by their sense that free-riding 
is immoral. However, they do not calculate the amount based on “an absolute moral imperative” but with respect 
to what others give (in Rose-Ackerman 1996: 713).  
14 I refer specifically to giving by Americans, for whom communities of participation may be especially 
significant predictors of charitable behavior. The determinants of giving vary from one culture to the next 




information about developing countries are increasingly accessible through the media and 
internet, exposure may lead to identification. News about the global consequences of poverty 
and inequality may also encourage individuals in the US to perceive their interests as tied to 
their international neighbors’ interests. As noted in Chapter One, a focal point of my research 
is to explore the possibility that educational and religious institutions encourage people to 
identify with and give to people living in the developing world. However, Batson and Shaw 
(1991) argue that attachments resulting from personal interaction are stronger than cognitively 
formed bonds. According to this argument, international travel and being born outside the US 
are likely to have a stronger effect on giving to international causes than purely perceptual 
associations.  
 
To explain giving to international causes by citizens in the United Kingdom, Atkinson (2007) 
builds a mixed model that combines “impure altruism” with a specific “identification 
approach.” The model is based on the assumptions that international donors 1) care about the 
well-being of recipients and 2) are moved by the feelings that arise when they “visualize” 
recipients15. Atkinson emphasizes the necessary inclusion of both factors; donors cannot be 
motivated purely by their desire to help ‘the poor’ because the immense number of potential 
recipients, the depth of need, and the relatively small size of the donor pool limit their 
capacity to help. Conversely, behavior cannot be purely motivated by ‘warm-glow’ feelings, 
since distressing feelings like worry over the effectiveness of aid do not preclude giving.  
 
2.3 Empirical Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
The theoretical debate attests that charitable giving is motivated by a complex mix of factors 
that are hard to pinpoint. Critical realist Roy Bhaskar explains the empirical dilemma: while 
real mechanisms generate actual phenomena, those mechanisms do not generate uniform 
events, and thus the ‘real’ may or may not be empirically observable (Irwin 1997). However, 
                                                          
15 Atkinson notes that visualization is encouraged by development NGOs and is even “made concrete in 
programmes where donors ‘adopt’ families” (2007: 7). The idea that people actually live on less than $1 a day 
elicits not only aversive emotions, but the sense that relatively small donations can have a powerful impact 
(ibid). Atkinson’s model fits with literature suggesting that donors consider recipient identity - their level of need 
and ‘deservingness’ - when deciding how to allocate donations (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007; Batson and Shaw 




Bhaskar holds that insofar as mechanisms do generate observable, regular phenomena, social 
scientists can use what they learn for social good. Research on philanthropy has shown 
observable, regular, and statistically significant relationships between variables such as 
education, gender, income, religion and charitable giving (see Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). 
While the ‘real’ mechanisms which lead to charitable giving may not be directly measurable, 
quantitative research can describe observable phenomena.  
 
Due to the complex interplay of motivating factors, altruism is hard to qualify, much less to 
quantify. As a result, empirical research about giving usually asks “who gives” and “how 
much” rather than “why do people give.” By asking “who gives” - or, in more particular 
terms, “who gives to which causes” - we may learn about the economic, political, social, 
psychological, and even biological forces that motivate international giving. 
  
The Determinants of Giving 
The literature is largely silent on “who gives to international causes,” (Atkinson 2007; 
Micklewright and Schnepf 2007; Okten and Osili 2007). However, there is more than enough 
evidence that: 1) giving more generally is influenced by a number of demographic, attitudinal, 
and behavioral variables and 2) these variables shape identification with different causes in 
different ways. In this section, I review the empirical literature, focusing on commonly 
studied determinants such as income, education, religion, and gender16. Where it is available, 
I review work that disaggregates causes. Yoshioko (2008) descriptively explores the 
charitable preferences of million-dollar donors. Others utilize econometric analysis: Marx 
(2000) looks at the gendered determinants of giving to human services and Steinberg and 
Wilhelm (2005) find a significant effect of race on giving to the homeless. As noted in 
Chapter One, the Southampton Statistical Sciences Research Institute (S3RI) at Oxford 
University is currently exploring the determinants of international charity by citizens of the 
UK, and Okten and Osili (2007) provide the only available econometric analysis of the 
determinants of giving to “international aid and peace” by individuals in the US. Findings 
from these studies are incorporated into the literature review.  
 
                                                          
16 As in the theoretical review, I use existing reviews of the literature as well as individual studies. Bekkers and 
Wiepking (2007) give a comprehensive review, to which I frequently refer. Unless otherwise specified, all 
studies were performed in the USA. Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) review the international literature, so citations 




Financial Capital  
Income is a fundamental component of any study on philanthropy. Research consistently 
shows that as income increases, so does the probability that a household gives to charity 
(Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink 1998; Brown and Rooney 2005; Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). 
Income is also significantly and positively related to the amount given (Regnerus, Smith, and 
Sikkink, 1998; Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). Income has little effect, however, on the percent 
of income donated (Steinberg and Wilhelm 2003; Havens and Schervish 1995). 
  
The effect of income on donations may vary across causes. Yoshioka (2008) reports his 
interesting descriptive finding that the causes wealthy Americans support vary by the way in 
which they made their money: entrepreneurs, scientists, physicians, and inventors are more 
likely to give to international organizations than investors, professional athletes, heirs, and 
salary recipients, who are more likely to give to other causes such as religion, education and 
health. As suggested previously, international philanthropy is stereotypically associated with 
rich celebrities and million-dollar donations, but research does not indicate a clear 
relationship between income and giving to international causes. Micklewright and Schnepf 
(2007) find that in the UK, when other factors are held constant, income does not have a 
statistically significant effect on giving internationally, but does, for example, on the 
probability of giving to children’s charities and to domestic causes combined. Okten and Osili 
(2007) find a significant positive relationship in the US between household income and giving 
to international causes, but that wealthier households are less likely to believe that the 




Controlling for income and other correlated factors, education positively affects charitable 
giving, both in the propensity to give and the amount given (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007; 
Steinberg and Wilhelm 2003; Havens and Schervish 1997). Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) 
note that Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink (1998) do not find a significant relationship between 
education and giving in the US, but that they only examine giving to ‘the poor.’ One can 
therefore deduce that education affects giving to particular causes differently. In the UK, 
Micklewright and Schnepf (2007) find that giving internationally is uniquely associated with 




educational achievement and support for international organizations in the US: households 
with advanced degrees are the most likely to give, and those headed by people with at least a 
college degree are the least likely to think the government is spending too much on 
international development assistance. 
 
Social Capital  
Brown (2001) argues that some of the effect of education is better explained by social capital 
variables which are often left out of the giving equation. In other words, it is not the fact that 
someone has an education, but how education embeds him in a community that leads to 
charitable giving. Brown (2001: 15) finds that when income and “the richness of the 
respondent’s networks of social capital” are controlled for, education still predicts giving, but 
to a lesser extent. Many studies similarly explore the effect of social capital on giving. Wang 
and Graddy (2008) find that “civic engagement” is significantly associated with an increased 
probability of giving. Havens and Schervish (1997: 256) find that variables pertaining to 
“communities of participation” are the most predictive of the percentage of income given, 
explaining that “the identification process is amalgamated with and or triggered by active 
involvement and participation”17. They conclude that it is not personal generosity, but 
associational “opportunities and obligations” which shape giving (ibid).  
  
One of the most commonly studied sources of social capital and determinants of giving in the 
US is religion. When all causes are taken together, religious Americans are not only more 
likely to give, but they give more in total, give a greater percentage of their income, and are 
more likely to give to secular causes (Rose-Ackerman 1996; Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink 
1998; Berger 2006; Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). Clearly, the values and behaviors 
institutionalized by religious organizations affect the way American religious practitioners 
steward their resources. 
  
Wang and Graddy (2008) note that active community involvement is what separates givers 
from non-givers, not the domain in which individuals are involved. Non-religious group 
                                                          
17 Havens and Schervish (1997) test the effect of five main sets of variables on the percent of income given: 
communities of participation, frameworks of consciousness, direct requests for charity, experiences from youth, 
and the existence of discretionary resources. They find that three of the five most significant predictors are in the 
“communities of participation” category. They are careful to explain that while the other factors do not show 




membership may be as predictive of giving as religious membership. Still, different types of 
social networks may influence donors to support different causes. Whaites (1999) notes, for 
instance, that compared to other charitable causes, a large portion of northern international 
development organizations are religiously based. Perhaps this is because many religious texts, 
traditions and mores command believers to serve those in need and to transform the 
institutions which perpetuate need (Ferris 2005). Another explanation is that religious 
institutions may encourage believers to engage financial resources in their attempt to convert 
non-believers. 
  
Distinguishing between religious and non-religious membership may explain some of the 
variance in causes that people support. Likewise, distinctions between faiths, denominations 
and sects may be fruitful (Berger 2006). All causes taken together, Bekkers and Wiepking 
(2007) and Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink (1998) find denominational variation in the amount 
donated, where Steinberg and Wilhelm (2003) do not.  This effect may also vary across 
countries. For instance, church attendance does not predict the propensity to give in Germany, 
but it does in the US (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). 
 
Demographic Factors  
Financial, human, and social capital influence giving. The quantity and quality of capital to 
which people have access is influenced by demographic factors such age, gender, race, and 
geographic region. Therefore, it is necessary to control for the effect of these variables on 
giving.  To do so also illustrates the significant effect that social identity has on giving 
(Berger 2006).  For instance, because experience and resources accumulate and values change 
over time, age affects giving, and may be particularly associated with giving to certain causes. 
Age is typically found to be positively associated with the propensity to give and the amount 
given (Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink, 1998; Bekkers and Wiepking 2007), but at a 
diminishing rate (Brooks 2007).   
  
Philanthropic literature has extensively explored the relationship between gender and 
charitable giving. While findings vary by country and study, in most cases, women are found 
more likely to give, and to give to more causes (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007; Piper and 




as discussed, altruism is a complex concept, and it may have different applications for 
different gender roles. In an experimental study in Scandinavia and North America, Brunel et 
al (2006) find that male and female test subjects prefer different charity appeals: in more 
masculine, individualistic societies like the US and Canada, men respond more readily to 
egoistic requests for charity (e.g. “your help is needed”) while women prefer altruistic 
solicitations (“someone needs help”). In more feminine Scandinavian societies, women prefer 
egoistic and men altruistic appeals. Interestingly, all subjects other than American men 
believed the government has a greater responsibility toward others than they have personally.  
 
If indeed there are differences in the way men and women tend to identify with and help 
others, then they may give to distinct causes which appeal to their gendered ideals. Therefore, 
the more interesting results are those that disaggregate causes. Marx (2000) reports that more 
women than men give to human services in the US, and explains that women are significantly 
more likely to believe they have the power to improve the welfare of others. Micklewright 
and Schenpf (2007) find women in the UK to be more likely to give to all causes except 
sports and the arts. Concerning international development, they find that women are more 
likely to give, but there is no statistically significant difference in the amount given.   
  
When there are differences in the amount given, controlling for income can reveal the cause 
of the disparity: income inequality. This applies also to race. Studies show that once education 
and income are controlled for, differences in both the propensity to give and the amount given 
disappear (Musick, Wilson and Bynum 2000; Steinberg and Wilhelm 2005). However, even 
when controlling for the effect of said factors, research finds variance in the ways different 
races give and the causes they support. Steinberg and Wilhelm (2005) find that African-
Americans at all income levels are more likely than whites to give money and other resources 
to homeless people. According to the idea that people give to those with whom they identify, 
their finding makes sense, since African-Americans are disproportionately represented in the 
US homeless population. Musick, Wilson, and Bynum (2000) find that African-Americans 
have less human capital on average than whites, but social capital makes up some of the 
difference; church attendance has a greater effect on black than white volunteering, for 





Cultural differences are not limited to race and ethnicity. Divergent political, economic, and 
social climates in the four major US regions - Northeast, Midwest, South, and West - may 
affect people’s giving patterns and preferences. Bielefeld, Rooney, and Steinberg (2005) find 
that the state-level poverty rate, income gap, public expenditures and political culture - what 
they call “macro-level” variables - influence giving, even when holding other factors such as 
income and education constant. Regional differences may also influence support for 
international causes. Supporting the idea that people who give internationally identify with 
the foreign recipients, Okten and Osili (2007) find that non-immigrant households in 
communities with sizable immigrant populations are significantly more likely to give. Kerlin 
and Reid (2006) note that the majority of international aid organizations are situated on the 
east and west coast and in Texas and Florida. Awareness about international issues is likely to 
be greater in the places where there are large immigrant populations.    
 
“Macro-level” Determinants 
Other macro-level factors that may influence charitable giving include natural, economic, and 
geo-political shocks. Crises like the 2001 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York 
City, the devastating 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia and recently high unemployment rates in 
the US bring about great need, but do they also elicit a strong charitable response by 
individuals? To the extent that the consequences of crises can be disaggregated, Brown and 
Rooney (2005) use data from Giving USA and the Internal Revenue Service to explore 
whether high giving periods from 1939-1999 are statistically more associated with crises or 
with favorable economic conditions. They find that economic factors are much more 
predictive of giving to all causes taken together than crises. While they are encouraged that 
crises do not lead to dramatic fluctuations in philanthropy, they are discouraged that neither 
do crises seem to stimulate magnanimity18.  
  
Giving to all causes combined may be primarily subject to economic conditions, but different 
types of crises may evoke different philanthropic responses. For instance, while less than two 
percent of US households typically give internationally, 26 percent gave to the 2004 tsunami 
relief efforts (COPPS 2005). These donations may have replaced others, perhaps even those 
                                                          
18 Brown and Rooney (2005) stipulate that some of their results suggest a larger association between 
philanthropic giving and crises, and that further research is needed to clarify. They specifically note the value of 




that would have gone to more long-term international development. The point remains that 








If different people give to different causes for different reasons, then research can identify 
divergent determinants using data which survey a sufficiently large and representative sample 
of charitable donors, which include a variety of demographic and behavioral variables, and 
which distinguish between the causes supported. Briefly, my approach to the research 
problem is to analyze such a data source - “Giving and Volunteering 2001” - with a series of 
logistic regressions where the dichotomous dependent variables indicate whether the 
respondent gave to particular causes, and the independent variables are a fixed set associated 
with charitable giving. By comparing the regression results, I am able to confirm that the 
determinants of giving vary by cause. My focus is on the unique determinants of giving to 
international programs. In this chapter, I describe the data set, discuss how it shaped my 
methodological approach to the research question, and explain the statistical methods used. 
 
3.2 The Data Set 
Between March and June, 2001, the Independent Sector (2001) collected data for “Giving and 
Volunteering in the United States 2001” with the intent purpose of exploring philanthropy 
among American individuals19. The data set, which describes the charitable behavior of 4,216 
American households during 2000, contains a wide variety of demographic, attitudinal, and 
behavioral variables, and differentiates between 14 different causes to which households 
made contributions. The data were collected by random digit dial telephone interviews. 
Participants were adults, 21 years of age and older, who answered the phone or were available 
for interview. For representativeness and analytical purposes, a subsample of males and an 
over-sample of ethnic minority and high income households were taken and duly weighted. 
My analysis of the data is also weighted. Of the 4,216 respondent households, 3,874 (92 
percent) contributed to at least one cause in 2000, while many gave to more than one of the 
following causes: Adult Recreation; Arts, Culture, and Humanities; Education; Environment; 
Health; Human Services; International or Foreign Programs; Non-Family Individuals; 
Political Organizations, Private and Community Foundations; Public or Societal Benefit; 
                                                          
19 The Independent Sector is a private, non-profit coalition of hundreds of charitable organizations in the US, and 




Relatives; Religion; and Youth Development. The 14 corresponding survey questions ask 
respondents if their household gave to each individual cause in 2000 and include a short list of 
examples for each cause that were read to the respondent (see Appendix 1 which includes the 
survey questions for all causes).  
 
The question pertaining to international giving was:  
In 2000, did you and members of your household contribute money or property to or for 
international or foreign programs, either in the US or abroad? Examples include relief abroad and 
student or cultural exchange programs. 
Only 264 households indicated that they gave specifically to international causes - about six 
percent of giving households, compared to about 63 percent of households that gave to 
religion, for instance (see Table 1 below). Okten and Osili (2007) find similarly small support 
for international aid organizations based on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
2001 and 2003 - just four percent of households gave to international causes, constituting only 
one percent of total charitable donations for those years. The relatively small proportion of 
households contributing to international programs is in itself an interesting finding, but it also 
indicates that households which prioritize international giving may have unique 
characteristics.   
 
Table 3.1 Proportion of total donor population that gave to each cause 





Human Services 0.36 
(0.007) 
Adult Recreation 0.06 
(0.004) 
(Non-Family) Individuals 0.26 
(0.007) 






Public/Societal Benefit 0.11 
(0.005) 










Youth Development 0.35 
(0.007) 
Total observations 4178   
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses 







While the data set provides the necessary components to explore my research question, there 
are some limitations. Perhaps the most significant limitation is that within the survey 
questionnaire, delineations between charitable organizations are not ideal. The category 
“international or foreign programs” includes donations made to international organizations 
which do not necessarily benefit development causes per se, such as “student or cultural 
exchange programs”20. Despite the inclusion of these donations in the international category, 
as noted in Chapter One, Kerlin and Reid (2006) find that the majority of donations to 
international causes are specifically for the developing world; almost three quarters of 
international NGOs and 90 percent of the donations they receive are designated for 
“development and assistance.” The remaining organizations and donations belong to the two 
categories, international understanding (which includes exchange programs) and international 
affairs.  
 
An associated concern is that donations to other causes like “private and community 
foundations” and “public and societal benefit” may actually go to international programs: 
Ford, Rockefeller, Rotary, and Lyon’s all have local and international branches. Likewise, 
donations to youth development and health may be designated for programs in developing 
countries. In their annual “Global Philanthropy Index,” the Hudson Institute (2007) reports 
that $15.9 billion of donations to religion, education, and other private voluntary 
organizations in 2006 were designated for international purposes. Unclear delineations 
between causes are not unique to the Giving and Volunteering data set21. The philanthropic 
sector lacks a collective approach to classifying international donations (Kerlin and Reid 
2006; Hudson Institute 2007, 2008).   
 
While overlapping charitable categories limit my research - which is to discern and describe 
the private donor base for international development - I am confident that the donor’s 
                                                          
20 One advantage of the Giving and Volunteering system of classification is that it distinguishes formal donations 
to international organizations from informal donations to relatives in foreign countries (remittances). There are 
obviously different determinants for these. My research interest is on the determinants of giving to formal 
international aid organizations.  
21Okten and Osili (2007) use the 2001 and 2003 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics which ask if 
respondents gave to international aid, but only after asking if they made donations to supply the poor with basic 
needs.  Because these are presented as two mutually exclusive categories, with donations to the poor preceding 
international donations, the survey may have prompted respondents to attribute their donations to developing 




intention ultimately comes through. To begin with, since health and education precede 
international causes in the sequence of survey questions, and since the specific examples 
given for health and education - such as hospitals, clinics, libraries and primary schools (see 
Table A.1 in the Appendix) - conceivably primed respondents to think locally rather than 
globally, they may have attributed donations to international health and educational programs 
to the international category. Another favorable possibility is that, because questions about 
giving to education and youth development precede international programs, respondents may 
have attributed donations which benefit American student exchange programs to these 
domestic categories. Essentially, I rely on my assumption that donors who give deliberately to 
international development indicate their priorities appropriately. The category of 
“international or foreign programs” captures those who give to international development, and 
more fundamentally, those who look outside the US when designating their donations. 
Whether they give to a student exchange program or to a capacity-building development 
project, people who give internationally are likely to care about the welfare of global citizens, 
to value cultural interaction and exchange, and to identify their interests with people outside 
their immediate geographic frame of reference. These values, and the attitudes and behaviors 
resulting from them, need to be better understood.   
 
Another limitation of the data set is that it was collected almost a decade ago. Not only is it 
possible that events like the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York changed the way Americans 
think about international relations and how they designate their charitable donations, but it is 
also likely that globalization continues to fundamentally alter the way people identify their 
interests in relation to people in other countries. Based on the evidence previously cited that 
giving is strongly influenced by economic conditions and on the likelihood that “giving 
begins at home,” international donations may especially suffer during recessions such as the 
US is currently experiencing22. Notwithstanding the effect of economic and other shocks on 
international giving over the past decade, I assume that there are independent factors 
                                                          
22  From the Independent Sector’s official report on “Giving and Volunteering 2001” (2002a: 25): “Since the data 
for this survey were collected in 2001, the economy has taken a decidedly downward turn. The stock market has 
declined, unemployment has increased, confidence in major corporations has suffered, and the US has gone to 
war...while not all signs are negative, with new home sales reaching all time highs and mortgage interest rates 
remaining low, there is concern in the sector that individual giving has already begun to decline. This study 
clearly shows that people who are worried about their personal financial condition give less than those who are 
not worried, so non-profit organizations need to plan.”  





associated with giving to international causes, and that understanding these factors enables a 
contextual application.   
 
My analysis is also restricted to some degree by the way in which the survey questions were 
posed and the data on giving was collected. Specifically, respondents were asked a variety of 
questions about their individual demographic, attitudinal and behavioral characteristics, but 
these characteristics were not captured for other household members. Conversely, respondents 
were asked about charitable donations and income at the household, but not at the individual 
level. The data thus provide the respondents’ personal education level, race, frequency of 
attendance at religious services, beliefs and attitudes, etc., but only whether any household 
member gave to each type of cause. Rather than convolute my analysis with incompatible 
individual and household-level variables, I limit my analysis to a subsample of respondents 
who were also the charity selectors in their households. The questionnaire asks specifically: 
 Even though members of a household give as a unit, individual members may select certain 
charities or nonprofit organizations to support. Who in your household is considered most 
involved in deciding which organizations you give to?  Would you say yourself, your spouse or 
partner, both, yourself and your spouse or partner, or another household member?   
By limiting my analysis to respondents who answered that they, themselves decided which 
organizations to support, I ensure that the determinants of giving to each cause correspond to 
the appropriate donor characteristics. To be certain that there were no systematic differences 
between the complete household sample of givers and the charity selector sub-sample in 
terms of the causes supported, I compared the percentage of givers to each cause in each 
sample. There were no significant differences (see Tables 1 and 2).  
 
When only counting charity selectors, the sample size of donors who gave internationally 
drops from 264 to 136 individuals23. Even though there are relatively few households that 
gave internationally, these cases provide sufficient data for analysis. To ensure statistical 
power in regression analysis, I followed the general rule that for every independent variable in 
the model, there need to be at least ten test cases corresponding to the dependent variable 
                                                          
23 An alternative to decreasing the sample size was to run regressions at the household level. However, the dearth 
of household level information would have limited my analysis substantially.  Key covariates of giving such as 





(Field 2005).  Therefore, I have enough degrees of freedom to test my 11 variables of interest, 
which I describe in the next section at length.  
 
Table 3.2 Proportion of charity selectors who donated to each cause  





Human Services 0.38 
(0.010) 
Adult Recreation 0.06 
(0.005) 
(Non-Family) Individuals 0.30 
(0.010) 
The Arts 0.18 
(0.008) 




Public/Societal Benefit 0.12 
(0.007) 










Youth Development 0.36 
(0.010) 
Total observations 2183   
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: Own Calculations from Giving and Volunteering USA 2001 
In the following analysis, I focus on the seven highlighted causes.  
 
Establishing that list of independent variables was somewhat challenging, because a notable 
advantage of the Giving and Volunteering data set is its wide range of interesting variables. In 
addition to standard demographics like age, gender, race, education, income, and geographic 
region, the data set includes attitudes and behaviors such as the respondent’s sense of moral 
responsibility to those in need, confidence in public and private organizations including 
charities, non-religious group membership, religious activity, volunteering, youth experience, 
and internet use. But to maintain theoretical relevance and to keep the regression model 
parsimonious, I include only those independent variables most consistent with the literature 
on giving and with my hypotheses.      
 
Despite its richness, the Giving and Volunteering data set does not include enough 
information to explain all the variance in giving behavior. For example, one conspicuous gap 
is a variable pertaining to travel - going abroad may have a greater effect on the likelihood of 
giving to international programs than religiosity has. In their qualitative research in the UK, 
Atkinson and Eastwood (2007) find that travel abroad strongly influences the decision to give 




limited24. In my regression results, the effect of missing factors is captured in the ‘noise’ that 
is not explained by the relationships between the dependent and independent variables. In the 
following section, however, I explain why the absence of certain factors is mostly immaterial 




The literature on giving, my hypotheses, and the characteristics of the data inform my 
methodological approach to the research question. In this section, I describe the set of logistic 
regressions I use to ask, “who gives to international causes?”  
 
Comparative Regression Analysis   
My econometric analysis consists of a set of logistic regressions which test the effect of 11 
independent variables on the likelihood of giving to each different cause25. Although I include 
tables in the Appendix (A.3-A.16) with regression results for all 14 causes, in my written 
analysis I focus on six causes: arts, culture and humanities (hereafter referred to as “the arts”); 
education; the environment; health; relatives; and religion (see the highlighted causes in Table 
3.2). For practical purposes, I limit my analysis to this more manageable size.  
 
I choose this particular set of causes because they represent a wide variety of charitable 
interests with distinct mechanisms for identification. People support artistic and cultural 
endeavors, the natural world, academic institutions, the sick, people in other countries, family 
members, and religious congregations as a result of experiences and preferences that may be 
easier for the researcher to understand or make assumptions about. This means I can make 
more informed predictions about the divergent determinants of giving. For instance, alumni of 
graduate institutions and religious congregants presumably support the organizations they 
identify as the source of important world-views and social networks.  People give to family 
members because they intimately know and love them, and also because they feel obligated. 
People who give to special interest/luxury causes such as the arts, the environment and 
                                                          
24 As noted, very little research has been done on the determinants of giving to different causes, thus explaining 
the insufficient data (Atkinson 2007; Micklewright and Schnepf 2007; Okten and Osili 2007). Future research on 
the determinants of giving to specific causes will need to be tailored to that purpose. 
25 I do not estimate a multinomial logit model in the econometric analysis as the categories of giving are not 




international programs may share high levels of human, financial and social capital 
corresponding to determinants such as level of education, income, and non-religions 
membership. However, their various giving preferences may be the result of different values 
and world-views corresponding to gender, religiosity, and race. Insofar as these characteristics 
are captured by variables in the data set, I am able to test them for systematic variance. In 
addition, it is interesting to compare causes that have a large donor base (religion, relatives, 
health, and education) to those with a smaller base (the arts, environment, and international 
causes); people who give to the latter causes may have uncommon characteristics.  
 
 Rather than building separate models for each cause, I use a consistent regression model 
across all causes. The most obvious reason is that the data set does not contain sufficient 
information to build well-tailored models that predict giving to each individual cause. The 
fundamental reason, however, is methodological: the extensive literature on the determinants 
of charitable giving identifies several significant predictors including income, education, and 
religion. Furthermore race, gender, and other demographics have a bearing on whether or not 
people give. To begin exploring the determinants of giving to disaggregated causes, it makes 
the most sense to compare the effect of these variables on each cause. For instance, one’s 
level of education may have a larger effect on giving to the arts than to relatives. By 
regressing a consistent model across the causes - where all the same variables are controlled 
for - I am able to compare these effects and thus to identify differences in the determinants of 
giving. To explore my prediction that religiosity and education affect international giving to a 
greater degree than domestic giving, it is especially effective to have comparable results.  
 
Logistic Regression 
As this study explores the relationships between binary categorical dependent variables and a 
set of categorical or continuous predictor variables, I use logistic regression analysis. Logistic 
regression predicts the log odds of the dependent variable Y, where β 0 is the constant, and 
where there are z independent variables X (Field 2005):  
Yi= β 0+ β 1X1i+ β 2X2i+...+ β zXzi 
In each regression, Y is a dichotomous variable representing whether or not the respondent i 




he/she did give. The independent variables X are those I chose based on the literature and my 
hypotheses.    
  
Because I am more interested in the relative effect of the predictors on giving to different 
causes, I base my interpretation not on the overall fit of the regression model and 
corresponding statistics, but on the relationships between each dependent and independent 
variable and their significance. The odds ratio is well-suited to this purpose because it 
captures the change in the odds that an event occurs for every unit change in the independent 
variable, all other factors held constant (where the probability that one gives (Y=1) is divided 
by the probability that one does not give (Y=0)) (Field 2005). For instance, imagine that the 
odds ratio for the effect of foreign travel on giving to international causes is 2.80. Therefore, 
compared to a respondent who has never been outside the US, a world traveler is 280 percent 
or 2.8 times more likely to give to international causes. By basing my analysis on the odds 
ratio, I am able to compare the effect of different factors on giving to different causes and, 
consequently, to identify divergent determinants.   
 
Independent Variables  
In this section, I describe the independent variables I include in the logistic regression model 
and explain the empirical and theoretical grounds for their inclusion26. Each commentary 
corresponds to material covered in the literature review and is supplemented with findings 
from the Independent Sector’s (IS) analysis of the Giving and Volunteering data. Although 
their econometric analysis is limited to the determinants of giving to all causes taken together, 
they disaggregate causes in descriptive analysis to show, for instance, that different causes 
receive different levels of support. They submit that “giving and volunteering vary by type of 
organization, and there are differences in the types of organizations, and there are differences 
in the types of people that support different organizations” (2002a: 18). 
 
Per capita household income 
Income is consistently identified as one of the most important predictors of charitable 
behavior. For the Giving and Volunteering data set, the IS (2002a: 18) finds that “household 
                                                          





income is the single major predictor of household giving;” as income increases, so does the 
propensity to give.  
 
There is likely to be a positive and significant relationship between income and giving to 
international causes, not only because people with higher incomes are more able to afford 
giving at home and abroad, but because they are also more financially able to travel abroad 
(holding education and other factors constant). As the effect of income on giving may not be 
consistent across causes, I predict that income will be more significant for giving to the arts 
(which could be considered a luxury good) and less significant for giving to religion, than it is 
for international causes.   
 
The Giving and Volunteering survey question for income was: 
 To get a picture of people's financial situation we need to know the general range of income of all 
people we interview.  What was the total annual income before taxes, of all members of your 
household in 2000?  Please include wages, salaries, interest, dividends, social security, and other 
forms of income.   
Non-respondents were asked for the same information at $10,000 increments. To test if 
financial resources available to the individual have a greater effect on giving to some causes 
versus others, I use per capita income (household income divided by household size)27.    
 
Education 
The IS (2002a) also finds that the propensity to give increases with the respondent’s level of 
education. As education informs one’s employment, interests, hobbies, and values, it may 
have an even stronger bearing on the type of organization one supports. According to my 
hypothesis that education expands the realm of identifications people make, I predict that 
international giving significantly increases with the level of education. The more educated a 
person is, the more he or she may be aware of, concerned about, and committed to the plight 
of people in developing countries. Conversely, I do not expect to find a strong relationship 
between education and religious giving, for instance. It is important to point out that the 
probable collinearity between education and household income make it difficult to determine 
                                                          
27 Before dividing by household size, I rescaled income to make the regression results more tractable: because a 
$1 increase in income is not associated with a large enough increase in the likelihood of giving, I divided income 
by 20,000 so that for every one unit increase in income (where $20,000 is one unit), respondents are X percent 




the exact nature of the relationship, as well-educated, globally-aware individuals are likely 
also to have a high income. I will comment on this further in the presentation of the results in 
the following chapter.  
 
The data set captures the following five levels of education: 1) less than high school graduate, 
2) high school graduate, 3) some technical, trade, or business school/college, 4) four year 
college/university degree (BA, BS), or 5) some graduate or professional school (MA, MS, 
Ph.D.). Education is entered as one index variable to preserve degrees of freedom; however I 
test the sensitivity of my results to the inclusion of education as a set of dummy variables.    
 
Religion 
The effect of religion is a common theme in literature on philanthropy in the US. According 
to the IS (2002b: 8), affiliation with a church, mosque, synagogue, temple or other religious 
institution is one of the most powerful predictors of giving: “the beliefs, values, attitudes, and 
commitments of those who contribute to religion translate into high levels of generosity to 
other causes as well.”  
 
A central tenet of my hypothesis is that religious institutions encourage people to identify 
with and give donations to people/organizations in the developing world. Therefore I predict 
that religiosity is significantly and positively associated with international giving, to a greater 
degree than with domestic giving28. To test the effect of religion on the likelihood of giving to 
different causes, my regression model includes a variable representing religiosity. Because 
religious membership may not be a good indicator of one’s actual involvement in a religious 
community or one’s commitment to religious values, I have chosen instead to use the 
frequency of attendance at religious services as a measure of religiosity. Personal attendance 
is captured at four levels: 1) not at all, 2) only a few times a year, 3) once or twice a month, or 
4) nearly every week or every week. As with education, these values are represented by an 
index rather than separate dummy variables, but are tested in the sensitivity analysis as such. 
 
                                                          
28 The Independent Sector’s (2002b) descriptive analysis of the data for relationships between religion, charity, 
and volunteering suggests the kind of econometric analysis my research entails: households which give 
internationally give more to religion, on average, than households that give to any other secular cause. In 2001, 
international donors gave an average of $2148 to religion. Households which supported foundations gave the 





Many studies find an effect of social or associational capital on prosocial behavior. Not only 
do financial and human capital increase the likelihood that someone “gives back” to his or her 
community, but so does active involvement in one’s community. In the US, religion is 
perhaps the most widely discussed source of social capital leading to prosocial behavior, but 
non-religious group membership is another aspect of community involvement, with decidedly 
different characteristics. People who belong to either a religious or non-religious organization, 
to both, or to neither will have different ideas about how to best benefit their local, national, 
and global communities. I predict that non-religious membership will have a smaller effect on 
international giving than religiosity, as certain religious values may more readily motivate 
members to spread their values abroad. Furthermore, while religiosity may have a more 
consistent effect on a giver’s attitude toward and perceptions about developing countries, non-
religious membership may have a wider range of implications. 
  
The variable I include in the regression for non-religious membership is dichotomous - 
whether or not the respondent belongs to a non-religious group. Examples that were provided 
to respondents in the survey include service clubs like Kiwanis and Rotary, alumni and 
neighborhood organizations, professional societies, labor unions, and sports or hobby groups. 
It seems logical to speculate that non-religious membership will be associated with giving to 
causes with membership opportunities such as political parties, the arts, recreation, and public 
and societal benefit. Unlike religiosity, I do not apply my assumption that non-religious 
membership is a poor indicator of involvement; for obvious reasons, it is less likely that a 




The IS (2002a) finds that volunteer experience in a respondent’s youth significantly increases 
the likelihood that she gives charitably as an adult. Bekkers and Wiepking (2007: 9) suggest 
the nature of the relationship: giving and volunteering are “complementary forms of prosocial 
behavior [that] arise from roughly the same set of social factors.” Volunteer experience in 




altruistic personality/orientation or, at least, in the adoption of altruistic values (Havens and 
Schervish 1997). Therefore, while religious and non-religious variables represent current 
sources of social capital, youth volunteering may indicate the formation of prosocial 
inclinations.   
 
According to my hypothesis that people who give internationally must overcome physical, 
geographical barriers to identification, youth volunteering may not be as significantly and 
positively associated with giving to international causes as with other humanitarian causes. 
Although it may increase the likelihood that one identifies with other people, it does not 
necessarily increase the likelihood those people will be outside one’s local community. On the 
other hand, it may be possible that youth volunteering exposes people to international causes. 
The survey question, “when you were young [18 and under] did you do some kind of 
volunteer work?” does not capture enough detail to establish whether a respondent 
volunteered for a local or international cause. Given the popularity of youth mission trips to 
developing countries (Salmon 2008), there very well may be a positive relationship between 
youth volunteering and international giving. 
 
Race 
As noted in the literature review, the race effect on charitable giving drops once financial and 
human resources are controlled for. The IS (2002a) attributes remaining variance to the fact 
that, in the US, white people are more likely to be asked to donate than African-American and 
Latino people.  
 
Despite the similar giving rates by race when income, education, and being asked to give are 
held constant, people from different racial/ethnic backgrounds may support different causes. 
For instance, given the importance of extended families in Latino and African-American 
culture, they may be more likely to give to relatives than white Americans. Informal 
remittances sent abroad by Latino families and donations to local relatives by African-





Because I am dealing with a limited population size and, therefore, limited degrees of 
freedom in my regression model, I include only three race dummy variables: white, Latino 
and African-American, with white as the reference category. There are so few respondents in 
the other race categories, that the results are not significantly altered by their exclusion. 
 
Age 
The IS (2002a) finds that the propensity to give increases with age, but decreases for people 
over 6529. Due to changing resources, experiences, and values, the causes that people of 
different ages support may vary. Regardless of the influence of age on giving to particular 
causes, it is an important variable to include in the regressions to control for the effect on 
financial and social capital. I do not predict that the likelihood of giving to international 
programs increases significantly with age, or at least any more so than it does for other 
causes.    
 
Gender 
In the empirical literature, gender is demonstrated to have a significant effect on the 
propensity to give and on the type of organization supported. I predict that women are 
significantly more likely to give to relatives and to causes that explicitly support children such 
as education and youth development, due to their roles in childbearing, childrearing, and 
family caretaking. I do not predict significant differences between men and women for 
international giving. Where traditionally defined altruistic concerns based on gender roles 
may make women more likely to identify with and give to the poor in developing countries, 
their inclination to give to the local poor may cancel out the difference.   
 
Children in the Household 
The presence of children in a household undoubtedly affects two key factors associated with 
giving preferences: resources available for charity and donor values. Because the former is 
accounted for in the regression by per capita income, the variable is likely to pick up the 
ideological effect that having children has on giving to different causes. While it is possible 
                                                          




that households with children are more likely to give to international causes - because parents 
are concerned with the well-being of children in the developing world and empathize with 
parents who struggle to feed their families - alternatively, it is possible that giving to domestic 
causes takes priority. Educational, youth development, and human service programs which 
benefit local children (with whom donors more readily identify) and which possibly benefit 
donors’ children may receive resources that would otherwise go to international programs.  
 
Region   
Regional differences may affect people’s giving behavior. The IS (2002a) finds that church 
attendance is associated with household giving in the South to a greater degree than in other 
regions. Regional differences may also affect giving preferences. For instance, people living 
in the southern “Bible Belt” may be more likely to give to religion regardless of their personal 
religiosity, and people in the Ivy-Leagued Northeast may be more likely to give to the arts, 
whether or not they attended prestigious liberal arts universities.    
  
I determined through exploratory analysis that with one exception, the South is the only 
region significantly associated (positively or negatively) with giving to any particular cause30. 
Because religiosity is controlled for in the model, we can assume there are additional factors 
in southern culture which lead to certain giving preferences. To conserve degrees of freedom 
in my regression model, I include “Southern” as the only regional dummy variable. 
Absorbing the other regions into the dummy variable’s reference category does not 
significantly alter results.   
 
Limitations of the Regression Model 
The regression model I describe above will likely fail to account for all the variance between 
giving groups. No statistical model perfectly explains variance, but in this case, the absence of 
variables relating specifically to each cause especially restricts explanatory power. In other 
words, the regression model may have a poor “goodness of fit” for each giving population31. 
                                                          
30 The exception is that giving to the arts is positively associated with living in the Northeast.  
31 I include Nagelkerke’s R2 in my results tables in the appendix, but emphasize that for regressions with a 
binary dependent variable, the goodness of fit of the entire model is less pertinent than the size and significance 




However, because the point of my research is comparative, I am less concerned with overall 
fit, and more concerned with how the aforementioned factors relatively shape the 
determinants of giving to different causes. Thus, the presence and absence of explanatory 
significance are equally interesting. For example, level of education may be strongly 
associated with giving to international causes but completely unrelated to giving to relatives. I 
am particularly interested in how the divergent determinants of giving suggest various 
mechanisms for identification. To continue the previous example, educational institutions 
may widen students’ reference frame and encourage them to identify with international 
individuals, issues and causes, but may not influence the sense of personal obligation one 
feels toward family members.  
  
Because this research focuses on giving to international causes, I do explore in sensitivity 
analysis an additional variable that relates specifically to international giving: whether a 
respondent was born in the US or another country. Undoubtedly, those born outside the US 
are more likely to identify with international people and causes. By testing the effect of this 
dichotomous variable, I attempt to explain a little more of the variance between international 
and other causes. Furthermore, I emphasize the point that future research should be tailored to 
explore the unique determinants of giving to particular causes.    
 
There are many other variables of interest in the Giving and Volunteering data set that could 
be particularly related to giving to international causes. For instance, compared to the average 
donor, people who give internationally could have a stronger sense of ‘noblesse oblige,’ the 
responsibility that some people of privilege feel toward the less socioeconomically privileged. 
In the Giving and Volunteering survey (2001: 217), respondents were asked if they “feel that 
those who have more should give to those who have less.” International donors may also be 
more inclined to feel that their donations help them abide by religious teachings to have 
compassion for and help people whom mainstream America often overlooks. The Giving and 
Volunteering survey (2001: 216) accordingly asks respondents if they “give to fulfill religious 
obligations or beliefs.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
R2 is a adaptation of the ‘coefficient of determination’  for logistic regression, similar to the R2  in linear 




These and many other interesting possibilities are captured in the data set. However, I do not 
include them in the regression analyses for two main reasons. The first is that it is difficult to 
rely on the accuracy of answers to attitudinal questions over the telephone, especially if 
respondents believe that certain answers will cast them in a more favorable light.  
 
The second reason is more complex: my hypothesis is built on the idea that prosocial behavior 
is the result of the universal mechanism which underlies (impurely) altruistic behavior: 
identification. People perceive their interests as indistinct from others’ interests and behave in 
ways that are mutually beneficial. Attitudes and values such as responsibility and compassion 
indicate that the identification mechanism is at play, but they do not explain where or how it 
came into play.  
 
In contrast to the attitudinal variables referred to above, demographic and behavioral variables 
may more readily account for the variance in the causes that people support.  For example, 
being foreign born better explains one’s support for international charity than that one feels a 
sense of responsibility toward others - the latter could be associated with giving to any and all 
causes. As another example, religious people may be more likely to give to international 
causes, not because they are innately more universally altruistic, but because they participate 
in communities which encourage them to identify their interests and concerns in this life and 
the ‘afterlife’ with people who presently suffer extreme poverty.   
 
Accordingly, the regression model I build attempts to demonstrate that different kinds of 
identification occur in religious or non-religious groups, within a particular ethnicity, in 
educational institutions, and as a result of community involvement in one’s youth, etc. Within 
the data set, being foreign born is the only other variable that potentially indicates the type of 
experience which might lead people to identify with and give charitably to people who live 
outside the US. Future research - which has the intent purpose of capturing the determinants 
of giving to the developing world - should include currently unavailable variables that 
indicate opportunities for identification like foreign travel, watching or reading the news, and 







The results of the regression analysis confirm that the determinants of giving vary by cause. 
Table 4.1 below presents the results from the regressions for international causes, the arts, 
education, the environment, health, relatives, and religion. The table displays only the odds 
ratios, standard errors, and level of significance. Because of space constraints, the regression 
coefficients are displayed in the Appendix tables A3-16.32  
 
In this chapter I begin by describing the determinants of giving to international causes, and 
then I compare these to the determinants of giving to other causes. Last, I briefly explore 
descriptive statistics for variables not included in regression analysis which offer interesting 
and relevant supplementary information. 
 
4.2 Logistic Regression Analysis Results 
 
The Determinants of International Giving 
As predicted, education, religiosity, non-religious membership, and youth volunteering all 
have a significant, positive effect on giving to international causes. The only other variable 
that is significant in the regression is being Latino, which has a positive effect33. Notably, 
there is no significant association between giving to international causes and income, being an 
African-American, age, gender, the presence of children in the household, or living in the 
South.    
 
Contrary to my expectations, non-religious membership and youth volunteering have a larger 
effect than both education and religion. The odds ratios suggest that those who are members  
 
 
Table 4.1  Logistic regression results for giving to particular causes 
                                                          
32 Tables A.3-16 in the Appendix present the coefficients for all 14 causes in alphabetical order, including those 
that are analyzed in depth here. When there are interesting results in these latter seven regressions that are 
applicable to the main discussion here will I point these out in the text. 
33An odds ratio greater than one corresponds to a coefficient with a postive sign while an odds ratio with a value 
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N 2087 2086 2085 2085 2087 2080 2088 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.082 0.229 0.148 0.114 0.147 0.042 0.462 
 
Significant at one percent level ***, five percent **, and ten percent*  
Notes: Due to space constraints, this table only shows odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses 
and significance levels. The coefficients are presented in the Appendix, Tables  A3-16.  The results are 
weighted to account for the data set’s subsample of male and oversample of ethnic minority 
respondents. Observation sizes (N) differ slightly for giving groups because there are a few missing 
values for the dependent variables (i.e. some respondents did not answer or were not sure if they gave 
to the cause in question). The omitted categories are: not a member of a non-religious group; did not 
volunteer in youth; white; male; no children in the household; and  Northeast, Midwest, and West. 
Source: Own calculations from Giving and Volunteering USA, 2001.   
 
 
of a non-religious group are 71.6 percent more likely to give to international causes than those 
who are not members, and that those who volunteered in their youth are 84.3 percent more 
likely to give to international causes than those who didn’t. In contrast, the odds ratios for 
religion and education suggest that, for every increase in the level of attendance at religious 
services, respondents are 36 percent more likely to give to international causes and for every 




These results will be discussed in more detail below, where they are compared to the results 
for other causes. 
 
4.3 Comparative Analysis: The Determinants of Giving Across Causes 
 
Income 
The results suggest that income does not predict giving to international causes34. In contrast, 
giving to five of the six other causes (except religion) is significantly and positively 
associated with income. For every $20,000 unit increase in income, the likelihood of giving to 
education increases by 22.1 percent, to the arts by 20.9 percent, to relatives by 13 percent, to 
health by 12.8, percent and to the environment by 9.3 percent35. High-paid graduates of 
educational institutions may feel gratitude, loyalty, and responsibility toward their alma 
mater. Wealthier people are more likely to afford expensive symphony tickets and museum 
memberships. Financially secure family members are more capable of giving than those who 
struggle to put food on their own tables. For international causes, while it is commonly held 
that giving is a luxury afforded by the super-rich, the data suggest a different story: there are 
other, more significant determinants associated with giving to international causes. Americans 
at all income levels may feel compelled to give to people who suffer extreme poverty in other 
countries. If religion does indeed motivate international charity, then as for religious giving, 
international giving may be less price-sensitive, more duty-bound than other causes.  
 
Illustrating an unsurprising collinearity between education and income, the effect of income 
decreases with the inclusion of education in the model. This is true for donors to all causes 
except relatives, for whom the effect of income increased. Giving to relatives is negatively 
associated with higher levels of education, suggesting that even if donors are less educated, 
the more income they bring home, the more likely they are to give to relatives. The 
                                                          
34Okten and Osili (2007) find that income does have an effect on giving to international causes. One possible 
explanation is that they compare international givers to all others in their sample population. This may mean that 
non-givers are included in their analysis. Because my study is on the determinants of giving to different causes, I 
do not include people who did not give. Those who give to international causes may have a significantly larger 
income than those who do not give at all, but no difference in income when compared to other givers. Another 
possibility is that the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, on which Okten and Osili base their work, provides 
more detailed information on income and other sources of wealth, and therefore equips them to test the effect of 
permanent rather than annual income on giving. Future primary research, which has the intent purpose of 
studying international philanthropy, should incorporate these considerations into its data design.  
35 Although not tested here, the effect of income on the amount that people give could vary by cause. An analysis 




insignificance of income as a predictor for giving internationally is robust to sensitivity 
analysis.   
 
Education 
As one’s level of education increases, the likelihood of giving to international causes 
increases by 22.9 percent. Education affects giving to religion to a similar degree at 20.8 
percent. On the opposite ends of the spectrum, a one unit increase in the level of education is 
associated with an 86.3 percent increase in the likelihood of giving to the arts, and a 12.2 
percent decrease in giving to one’s relatives (the only group with a negative association 
between education and giving). Clearly, education has the strongest effect on giving to the 
arts, but still a significantly large effect on giving internationally. Of the determinants tested, 
education is the strongest predictor for giving to the arts. For international giving, on the other 
hand, education ranks behind youth volunteering, non-religious membership, and religiosity 
in terms of the size of the effect. Therefore, in relative terms, educational institutions may 
more readily encourage people to identify with local causes - or simply provide them with 
access to and an appreciation of performing arts, ethnic heritage and the humanities - rather 
than with global humanitarian causes. 
 
When education is entered into the regression model as a set of dummy variables instead of as 
one index variable, a similar picture emerges36. However, there are interesting details. 
Compared to people in the reference category who have less than a high school degree, those 
with “some college” are about one and a half times more likely to give internationally, and 
those with “some graduate or professional school” are almost four times more likely. Having 
“some graduate or professional school” increases the odds of giving to education and the 
environment by roughly three and four, respectively. The results also increase for giving to 
the arts, but by a factor of ten: those with post-graduate experience are about 30 times more 
likely to give. Overall, it is post-graduate experience that has the strongest effect on giving to 
international causes, the environment, education and the arts. While educational institutions in 
general may encourage people to cultivate their interests and concerns - and also to financially 
support the relevant charitable causes - graduate programs require a level of commitment to 
one’s passions that may especially translate from the academic to the philanthropic sphere.   
                                                          
36 Because the results are largely the same, and because the alternate specification does not significantly change 





The effect of education on the likelihood of giving to international and other causes is robust 
to the inclusion of other variables. While the effect of education decreases when income is 
held constant, it does not change dramatically or lose its significance. Similarly, education 
loses a small amount of its effect when youth volunteering and non-religious membership are 
included in the model, yet the overall significance and direction of the effect are robust. 
Education is thus also positively correlated with past and present participation in one’s 
community.    
 
Religiosity 
Besides the large expected relationship with giving to religion, religiosity does not have a 
significant, positive effect on giving to any other cause except international programs. For 
every unit increase in attendance at religious services, the odds that a respondent gives 
internationally increase by 36 percent. Conversely, there is a negative and significant 
association between attendance at religious services and the likelihood that someone gives to 
the environment and to their relatives. Giving to one’s relatives is slightly negatively 
associated with religiosity, but the relationship is not robust in sensitivity analysis. There is no 
significant effect on giving to the arts, education, or health.    
 
To get a more detailed picture of the effect of religious attendance on giving, I tested an 
alternative specification where religiosity was included as a set of dummy variables37. 
Attending “not at all” was the reference category compared to “only a few times a year; once 
or twice a month; and every week or nearly every week.” Naturally, the likelihood of giving 
to religion increases at every level, with those who attend once or twice a month 16.4 times 
more likely to give, and those who attend nearly or every week 40.2 times more likely to give, 
than those who never attend. In this specification, the only significant effect of religiosity on 
international giving is for those who attend nearly or every week: they are 97.8 percent more 
likely to give. As an alternative specification, I recoded the religiosity variable as a dummy - 
where a score of ‘0’ was assigned to those who attend never or, at most, a couple times a year, 
and a score of ‘1’ was given to those who attend at least once a month. Respondents who go 
to religious services at least once a month are almost two and a half times more likely at the 
                                                          





one percent level of significance to give to international causes than those who rarely or never 
go to religious services. 
 
The results suggest that there is a uniquely positive association between religiosity and giving 
to international causes. Do religious institutions influence regular service-goers to perceive 
their interests as co-determined with the interests of people who suffer from poverty and 
inequality in the developing world38? At the very least, religious institutions may take up 
special collections for associated causes, thereby compelling service-goers to incorporate the 
financial needs of people living in other countries into their own budgets. In contrast, the 
results seem to indicate that highly religious people are less likely to identify their interests 
with the environment. In the US, the religious right is notorious for approaching natural 
resources as God’s unlimited gift to (hu)mankind. Thus, it is not surprising that those who 
attend services every week are about 40 percent less likely to give to the environment than 
those who never attend. 
 
Two notable correlations between religiosity and other variables in the model become 
apparent when tested in sensitivity analysis. For religious and international donors, the effect 
of religiosity on their likelihood to give decreases by about 10 percent when youth 
volunteering is controlled for. Donors who frequently attend churches or temples, etc., may be 
the type of people who also volunteer. Another possible explanation is that, in their youth, 
donors who attended religious services with their families were encouraged to volunteer at 
religious functions. For international givers, there is a similar correlation between religiosity 
and non-religious membership. Among all causes, there are no apparent correlations between 
education and religion or income and religion, indicating that religiosity is not determined by 




                                                          
38 Another possibility is that especially spiritual and compassionate people - who are committed to doing what 
they can for people in the developing world - also tend to frequent religious services. In that case, a variable 
measuring kindness and care would clarify whether it is personality, and not necessarily religiosity, that leads 
people to give internationally (the classic problem of endogeneity in econometrics). Nonetheless, I rely on my 
hypothesis that while compassion and commitment demonstrate that a person identifies with others, these 





Non-religious membership is significantly and positively associated with giving to every 
cause except religion and the environment39. Compared to those who do not belong to any 
non-religious group, those who belong are 77.6 percent more likely to give to the arts, 71.6 
percent more likely to give to international programs, 71.2 percent more likely to give to 
health, 46.8 percent more likely to give to education, and 26.5 percent more likely to give to 
relatives. The effect of non-religious membership on giving to the arts, international programs 
and health is similar. Because this variable provides no detailed information about the nature 
of that membership, it is difficult to say more than that non-religious membership appears to 
be an important contributing factor to prosocial behavior. Social capital increases the 
likelihood that people give to many different causes. As particularly social beings, people 
who actively participate in communities based on secular and mutual interests, hobbies, 
concerns, and/or commitments may simply be more likely to associate their own happiness 
and fulfillment with others’ well-being.   
 
The effect of non-religious group membership decreases somewhat when income and 
education are controlled for; this would be consistent with the assumption that donors who 
have the time to participate in and the access to a variety of secular organizations may have 
higher levels of education and income. The positive correlation is apparent for all groups 
except those who give to relatives, for whom the effect of non-religious membership increases 
when income and education are held constant. Given that Latino and African-American 
households are significantly more likely to give to relatives, the results reflect income and 
educational inequalities in the US.  
  
Youth Volunteering 
Youth volunteering is significantly associated with giving to all causes, but to varying 
degrees. Of the causes on which I focus in this analysis, international giving is affected the 
most; respondents who volunteered under the age of 18 are 84.3 percent more likely to give to 
international programs compared to 65.9 percent for the arts, 60.8 percent for education, 51.9 
percent for religion, 44.1 percent for health, 28.4 percent for the environment, and 24.1 
                                                          
39 Commitment to the environment may be driven more by personal convictions than group persuasions. 
Although environmentalism has become more mainstream since the data were collected, it was not long ago that 
individuals concerned with global warming and recycling, for instance, were commonly treated as suspect or “on 




percent for giving to relatives. If youth volunteering does contribute to the development of - 
or is an expression of - an altruistic personality, then it may also be that people who give to 
international causes are especially likely to exhibit these attributes. Another explanation is 
that people who volunteered for youth ‘mission trips’ outside the US are much more likely to 
give internationally as adults. By traveling abroad to a location where they saw need, and at a 
formative stage in their lives, these individuals may be especially likely to identify their own 
emotional well-being with the well-being of poor people in other countries.   
 
I also performed sensitivity analyses to identify collinearity with other key variables. Whereas 
for religious and international donors, the effect of youth volunteering decreases when 
religiosity is held constant, for people who give to the environment, the effect of youth 
volunteering increases by six percent: regardless of their attendance at religious services, 
people who volunteered in their youth may be more likely to give. When non-religious 
membership is held constant, on the other hand, the effect of youth volunteering decreases 
slightly, by about six percent, for all groups. Some possible explanations are that neighborly 
people who are oriented toward community involvement begin participating at an early age, 
or that prosocial experiences in youth have a lasting effect on a person’s lifestyle.   
 
When education is controlled for, the effect of youth volunteering decreases across causes 
between about five and ten percent. This is true for all causes except, again, giving to 
relatives. The picture that emerges in sensitivity analysis is that income, education, non-
religious membership and youth volunteering are correlated in a complex and mutually 
reinforcing relationship. Despite collinearity, each individual variable maintains its overall 
significance and effect, showing that the variables do represent somewhat distinct kinds of 
capital which provide people with different resources and motivations for charity. 
 
Race and Immigrant Status  
Using a set of categorical dummy variables with white as the reference category, I find that 
both African-American and Latino people are more likely to give to relatives (94.3 percent 
and 56.7 percent) and less likely to give to the environment (64.1 percent and 50.9 percent) 
than white people. These results are not surprising given that African-American and Latino 




than white culture. On the other hand, environmentalism may come across as a special 
“green” interest, typically more associated with white culture and privilege - it could be 
considered a luxury to turn one’s financial concerns to non-human causes. African-Americans 
are also 27.3 percent less likely than whites to give to health and 33.6 percent less likely to 
give to religion. One possible explanation, implied by Musick, Wilson and Bynum (2000), is 
that volunteering may replace financial contributions for African-Americans. Predictably, the 
effect of being African-American or Latino on giving increases when income is held constant, 
reflecting income inequality in the US.  
 
Because it is clear from the effect of race on giving that racial/ethnic background affects 
giving preferences and priorities, and because I assume that immigrants are especially likely 
to identify with international individuals and causes, I include “foreign born” into the 
regression model as an alternative specification. Holding all other factors constant, 
immigrants are almost four and a half times more likely than non-immigrants to give to 
international causes at the one percent level of significance. With the inclusion of ‘foreign 
born,’ the significance and effect of most other predictors remain constant. However the effect 
of non-religious membership increases by 14 percent and gains a level of significance such 
that international givers are 85 percent more likely than people who do not give abroad to be 
members of non-religious groups. This suggests that immigrants are less likely than native-
born citizens to belong to secular organizations. The effect of being Latino on giving to 
international causes also changes when place of birth is held constant - its significance drops 
away and the odds ratio becomes close to one. The implication is that it is not necessarily 
being of Latino descent that increases the likelihood of giving internationally, but being born 
outside the US, in a Central or South American country or elsewhere. 
 
Being born in or outside the US has no apparent association with giving to the arts, education, 
the environment, health, or religion. Nor does it affect the other predictors for these causes, 
except that the likelihood of giving to education increases for Latino people by nine percent, 
suggesting that US born people of Latino descent are more likely than immigrants to give 





Being foreign born does affect the likelihood that people give to their relatives. The results 
suggest that immigrants to the US are about 50 percent more likely than US-born citizens to 
give to family members at the five percent level of significance. Presumably, a significant 
portion of these contributions are remittances. As with giving to international organizations, 
when place of birth is held constant, the relationship between giving to relatives and being 
Latino drops in significance and loses 23 percent of its effect.   
 
One possible explanation for these results is that Latino donors who give to family members 
and to international aid organizations are first generation immigrants who maintain ties with 
individuals and causes outside the US, presumably in their countries of origin40. As I find no 
statistical differences between Latino and white people in giving to the arts, education, health, 
and religion, I infer that, in due course, Latino immigrants and their children make donations 
to local US causes as well. Accordingly, Osili and Du (2005) find that immigrants assimilate 
quickly into philanthropic culture in the US, giving much like natives do to formal charitable 
organizations, as well as to family members in the US and in their country of origin. 
 
Gender 
There are very clear divergences between the causes that men and women support. According 
to my analysis, women are 70.9 percent more likely than men to give to education, 62.9 
percent more likely to give to the environment, 57.3 percent more likely to give to health, 
29.3 percent more likely to give to relatives, and 26.2 percent less likely to give to religion 
than men. Women are more likely to give to more causes than men. As I predicted, however, 
gender has no significant effect on giving internationally. While women may give to 
education, health, and relatives - causes which largely attend to the needs of others, young and 
old - they may focus their efforts locally due to their concern for their immediate community, 
and/or for the potential positive externalities on their own families. Men, who are more likely 
to give to adult recreation, religion and political organizations, seem to support causes which 
align with their leisurely pursuits and/or ideological world-views. Therefore, while they may 
give to causes which they believe benefit humankind through the spreading of appropriate 
values and practices (i.e. through giving to religion and political organizations), this 
                                                          
40 About 14 percent of people who gave internationally and also to relatives sent money to relatives outside the 
US (remittances) - the largest proportion of any giving group. Only three percent of people who gave to the 
environment sent money to family in other countries. Roughly 12 percent of all people who gave to their 




motivation alone may not lead them to support international organizations that may or may 
not share their ideological position.  
 
Not only are men more likely to give to religion, but they may also be more likely to attend 
services regularly: when religiosity is held constant, the effect of gender changes such that 
men become 32 percent more likely to give to religion than women at the five percent level of 
significance. Controlling for religiosity also moderates the effect of gender on giving to the 
environment: women become ten percent more likely to give. 
 
Children 
The results suggest that the presence of children in the household does not have a statistically 
significant effect on giving to international causes, nor does it impact giving to health, 
relatives, or the arts. I predicted that parents may be more likely to empathize with people in 
the developing world who must watch their own children suffer from hunger and 
malnutrition. Alternatively, I suggested that donations to local children’s causes may replace 
those that might otherwise go to children in developing countries.  It is possible that these and 
other factors related to having children cancel each other out, or that the presence of children 
in a household by itself does not lead people to identify internationally.   
   
There is, however, an effect on giving to other causes: respondents with children are 23.4 
percent less likely to give to the environment, 69.4 percent more likely to give to religion, and 
90.8 percent more likely to give to education. Parents who want their own and other children 
in their community to grow up with ‘good values’ and solid schooling are clearly motivated to 
give to religion and education. Conversely, while it seems that parents would be especially 
concerned about the environment for their descendants’ sake, people who are concerned with 
the effect of population-growth on the environment may be more likely to make donations.  
 
 
In sensitivity analysis, both age and religiosity moderate the effect that having children in the 
household has on giving, but in different capacities for different causes. When age is held 
constant, the effect of children increases for donors to education but decreases for the arts, 




support different causes. When religiosity is controlled for, the effect of children on giving to 
the environment and religion becomes less negative and less positive, respectively. As the 
effect moves toward zero in both categories, there is an apparent correlation between going to 
religious services regularly and having children. However, this characteristic is apparently 
inconsequential for international donors for whom religiosity, but not the presence of children 
in the household, has an effect on giving.  
 
Age 
For every year increase in age, respondents are 3.5 percent more likely to give to religion, 2.8 
percent to health, and 1.5 percent to the arts. Because education and income are held constant 
in the regression model, changes in age may reflect differences in life experiences, values, and 
interests that occur as one ages. Naturally, when people retire, when their children grow up 
and leave the household, they have more time to pursue leisure and personal interests 
(reflected also by the collinearity between age and non-religious membership; see below). 
Their health also inevitably declines. This might inform their support for related charitable 
causes. As there is no statistically significant effect of age on international giving, it seems 
that accumulated experience does not as readily predict the growth of international concern as 
it does other considerations.   
 
As expected, age is correlated with education, non-religious membership, and the presence of 
children in the household. The effect of age decreases when education and non-religious 
membership are held constant, indicating that the older people are, the higher level of 
education they have and the more likely it is that they belong to non-religious groups.  
 
Region: Southern 
In the regressions, the region in which respondents live is usually not a significant predictor of 
whether or not they give to a particular cause, with a couple of exceptions. While there is no 
statistical relationship between giving to international causes and living in the South41, 
Southerners are 33.9 percent less likely to give to the arts and 29.9 percent more likely to give 
to relatives. Using an alternative specification with Northeast as the indicator and the other 
                                                          
41 The relationship is not robust to the inclusion of other factors, but people who give internationally are 
disproportionately represented in the West. About 25 percent of international donors live in the West, the largest 




three regions - South, West, and Midwest - absorbed into one reference category, people who 
live in the Northeast are about 40 percent more likely to financially contribute to the arts. 
Given the stereotype of southerners as less sophisticated and ‘cultured’ than people from the 
Northeast and West, it seems fitting that they are less likely to give to theatre, literature, and 
cultural preservation groups. However, the South is also esteemed for its especially rich 
tradition of music, literature, food and spirituality, often associated with African-American 
culture. It may be that the way the question was posed - with “the arts, culture, and 
humanities” as a rather erudite classification - deterred people from identifying their 
donations as such. The positive association between living in the South and giving to relatives 
also fits with the image of southern culture as particularly personal and family-oriented.  
 
Southern religiosity is another well-known American phenomenon, so I was surprised to find 
little effect on my results when I tested the effect of excluding the religion variable. The only 
notable effects are for giving to the environment and religion. Whereas it appears that 
southern respondents are about 20 percent less likely to give to the environment without 
religiosity controls, when religiosity is held constant, the significance of the effect disappears. 
Likewise, while southerners appear to be 33 percent more likely to give to religion than 
people living in the other three regions, when religiosity is held constant, the effect of living 
in the South loses its significance and drops all of its effect. The correlation implies that the 
American ‘Bible Belt’ persists.  
  
4.2 Additional Correlates of Giving: Descriptive Analysis Results 
 
Introduction 
Although the variables on which I report in this section lack empirical or theoretical grounds 
for inclusion in the regression, their descriptive results augment the profile of international 










Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for particular causes 








































































N 2183       
Notes: Standardized residuals - “the residuals of the model expressed in standard deviation units,” 
and comparable to the standard error (Field 2005: 746) - are in parentheses. The data are weighted . 
Descriptive results for all causes are included in Table A.17 in the Appendix. 
Source: Own calculations from Giving and Volunteering USA, 2001.   
 
International Donors Give Generously  
The descriptive statistics depict international donors as an especially generous and 
philanthropic group compared to donor groups for other causes. On average, those who give 
internationally give to 6.62 causes in total, the highest among giving groups. They are also the 
most likely to give to all the other focus group causes, except education (see Table A.18 in the 
Appendix for giving by cause). Not only do they give to a number of different causes, but 
they also incorporate their vast philanthropy into other personal financial considerations as 
well; international donors are the most likely to have a bequest to a charity in their will (i.e. 
they leave a portion of their wealth to a certain charity when they die), and they are the most 
likely to itemize deductions in their tax returns. Because itemization is a tedious process - in 
which the tax-payer claims his own list of deductions only if the total exceeds the standard 
deduction determined by the government for his income bracket - it is typically only practiced 
when a tax-payer determines it to be significantly worth his time to do so. The profile of 
international donors that emerges is one of philanthropic sophistication: they give a lot, yet 
know how to make giving work for them. They seem to be well-practiced at incorporating 
their own interests and the interests of charitable organizations (thus, the intended recipients, 





Furthermore, compared to other donor groups, international donors give on average the 
highest percent of their income to charity. The standard error is also the largest, and therefore 
the average is not as good a model as it is for other causes. Nonetheless, the international 
donor group includes people who give a relatively large percentage of their income to charity. 
Charitable ‘generosity’ has been the focus of much philanthropic research: what is it that 
causes some people to donate a larger percentage of their income than others? Research has 
suggested that low and high-income households give a larger percentage of their income to 
charity than middle-income households; however, Havens and Schervish (1995: 221) find that 
high levels of generosity are “mostly attributable to religious contributions and to a relatively 
small group of high-giving households at all income levels.” As described by the regression 
results, religiosity is a uniquely significant predictor for international giving. Thus, 
international donors’ generosity may be attributable to the behavioral and ideological 
commitments and values associated with religious practice, such as tithing, perceiving one’s 
money as belonging to God, and using one’s resources to serve others in need. Another 
possibility is that the unusually generous donors in the international giving group belong to 
Havens and Schervish’s “small group of high-giving households at all income levels,” for 





“Why do people give charitably” and “why do people give to particular causes” are two 
separate questions with different answers. Generally, people give because they are impure 
altruists who care about more than themselves and who get something out of giving. 
Specifically, they give money to struggling family members, old-growth forests in Alaska, or 
HIV/AIDS victims in the developing world because they identify especially with particular 
people and causes. There may be some very altruistic donors who give to all causes - or 
alternatively ‘neurotic’ donors who feel they must save the world - but most people identify 
with a few causes in particular. They do so based on experience, based on the specific 
environment in which they were raised, the people and causes to which they have been 
exposed, and the beliefs and world views they have adopted.  
 
By econometrically analyzing observable data on the characteristics of individual donors, I 
have attempted to identify the mechanisms by which people identify with different causes. I 
was particularly interested in the effects of education and religiosity on giving, and more 
specifically in the effect of these and other predictor variables on giving to international 
causes. Insofar as international donations are designated for charities in the developing world, 
I have tried to sketch a profile of the private donor base in the US for development NGOs and 
programs, and to contribute to the conversation about private resource flows between the 
‘North’ and ‘South.’ Who are the Americans who give some of their own money to ‘the 
needy’ in the developing world?  
 
The results of my econometric analysis indicate that experiences such as volunteering in one’s 
youth, belonging to a non-religious group, participating actively in a religious community and 
having a four-year college degree or more are strongly associated with giving to international 
charitable organizations. These are common predictors of giving to many causes, but the size 
of their effect varies. Because I have attempted primarily to identify the divergent 
determinants of giving to different causes - i.e. what makes the donor base for international 
charities unique - the more interesting results are those that compare the effect of each 
variable on each cause. In contrast to the donor base for other causes, people who give 
internationally are especially likely to have volunteered in their youth, to belong to non-




particularly associated with giving to international causes. While education - and especially 
graduate experience - may indeed increase the likelihood that people know about global 
issues, it seems that education is more readily associated with support for more non-
humanitarian causes such as the arts, the environment, and education.  
 
The effect of youth volunteering is largest for international donors, both compared to its effect 
on giving to other causes, and to the effect of the other variables on international giving. 
There are many potential explanations for the association. It is possible that youth 
volunteering exposes people at a formative stage to the needs of others, thus developing their 
inclination to identify with and try to help people in need. The relationship would be 
especially strong if volunteering took place abroad or with an international organization based 
in the US. Another possibility is that the youth volunteering variable picks up other 
characteristics inherent in the type of person who gives internationally that my regression 
model does not include, such as concern for others who are less fortunate and personal 
generosity.  
 
Belonging to a non-religious group is also an especially significant predictor for giving to 
international causes. Some non-religious groups such as Rotary or women’s advocacy 
organizations may have a special focus on international understanding and assistance, thereby 
facilitating members’ identification with international causes and individuals. Again, the 
variable may also pick up unobservable characteristics not in the regression model: perhaps 
people who actively participate in their local communities are, by their disposition, more 
concerned with and committed to the welfare of others, both locally and globally.  
 
Although its affect on giving is less significant than youth volunteering and non-religious 
membership, religiosity is uniquely associated with giving to international causes. Among all 
14 causes (except religion), donors in the international charitable group are singularly 
distinguished by their high level of religiosity. Many religious texts and traditions teach 
believers to identify with, practice compassion for, and serve people in need. Considering the 
level of suffering and need in the developing world caused by poverty and inequality, 
religious institutions may especially encourage believers to direct their efforts toward relevant 




Christianity in poor countries, religious Americans achieve two purposes with their support of 
international donations: helping ‘the needy’ and attending to their spiritual ‘salvation.’ Or, as 
I have suggested in Chapter Four, the type of person who gives to international charities, 
regardless of his or her other commitments, is also the type of person who tends to frequent 
religious services.   
 
International donors share a less common determinant with people who give to relatives: 
being born outside the US. Clearly, people who have lived in other countries are aware of and 
concerned about life outside the US. Immigrants may bring passion and valuable insight about 
life in other countries - especially developing countries - to their new communities and to the 
organizations they support with their donations. 
 
Future research that is tailored to the purpose of studying the factors that influence 
international giving is needed. There are many variables that may affect people’s knowledge 
of and therefore identification with international causes that were not available in the data 
used in this study, such as travel abroad and watching the news. Both quantitative analysis of 
the determinants of giving and qualitative inquiry about their operation in society would be 
fruitful. In my opinion, the apparent relationship between religiosity and international giving 
warrants a special focus. Just as the US government’s Official Development Assistance is tied 
to an agenda that demonstrates US interests, private aid presumably bears the principles and 
provisos of the people who supply it. For instance, one of President Obama’s first acts in 
office was to reverse the contentious “Mexico City Policy” that forbade government funding 
to international organizations which provide abortions or information about abortions, known 
also as the ‘global gag rule’ (New York Times 2009). Anti-abortion groups that criticized 
Obama’s decision have a large constituency in the religious right. Religious doctrines which 
inform these groups may similarly restrict private support for development organizations that 
advocate methods for the prevention of HIV/AIDS and pregnancy other than abstinence. 
Again, more research is needed to understand the implications. As religion is an especially 
sensitive subject, a ‘scientific’ approach to its influence on international giving would be 
beneficial. By studying these and other factors which shape charitable motivations, we may 






Table A.1 Survey questions and cause definitions 
Cause Survey Question 
Adult 
Recreation 
In 2000, did you and members of your household contribute money or property to or 
for adult recreation? Examples include swimming, boating, skiing, or hunting clubs. 
Arts, Culture, 
and Humanities 
(In 2000, ...for) arts, culture, and humanities? Examples include performing arts, 
cultural or ethnic groups, museums, art exhibits, and public television or radio. 
Education (In 2000, ...for) education? Examples include elementary schools, secondary or higher 
education (public or private), and libraries. 
Environment (In 2000, ...for) the environment, including animal welfare? Examples include the 
SPCA, and programs for environmental quality and beautification. 
Foundations (In 2000, ...for) private and community foundations? Examples include the Ford 
Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and local foundations. 
Health (In 2000, ...for) health? Examples include hospitals, mental health organizations, 
nursing homes, hospices, clinics, and the American Cancer Society. 
Human Services (In 2000, ...for) human services? For example, daycare, foster care, family counseling, 
consumer protection, homelessness, job services, the Red Cross, the YMCA, and 
charity drives like the United Way. 
Individuals 
(non-family) 
(In 2000, ...for) friends, neighbors, or strangers? 
International (In 2000, ...for) international or foreign programs, either in the U.S. or abroad?  
Examples include relief abroad and student or cultural exchange programs. 
Political (In 2000, ...for) political organizations and campaigns? Examples include political 
parties, nonpartisan political groups, and community groups. 
Public/Societal 
Benefit 
(In 2000, ...for) public or societal benefit? Examples include civil rights, minority and 
women's equity issues, community or social action, Rotary, and Kiwanis. 
Relatives (In 2000, ...for) relatives who don't live with you, including children and parents? 
Religion (In 2000, ...for) religious organizations?  Examples include churches, synagogues, 
convents, seminaries, and mosques. 
Youth 
Development 
(In 2000, ...for) youth development?  Examples include the Boys and Girl Scouts, 4-H 
Clubs, and Little Leagues. 
Notes: The value labels are No (0) and Yes (1). This section of the interview began as follows: “Now 
we're going to talk about charitable giving.  I'm going to read you examples of the many different 
areas in which households contribute money or other property for charitable purposes. By 
contributing, I mean making a voluntary contribution with no intention of making a profit.  For each 
area, please tell me whether you or the members of your household contributed some money or other 
property in 2000.” If asked, the interviewer was instructed to add, “Please include payroll 
deductions.” 





Table A.2 Mean characteristics and proportions for charity selectors 













Youth Volunteer 0.59 
(0.011) 




















Attendance at religious services: 
Not at all 
23.3 
(0.009) 
Gender (female) 0.61 
(0.011) 
Only a few times a year 23.2 
(0.009) 




Once or twice a month 12 
(0.007) 
Region (Southern) 0.39 
(0.011) 
Every week or nearly every week 41.2 
(0.011) 
Total Observations 2183 
Notes: The results are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Source: Own Calculations from Giving and Volunteering USA, 2001.  
 
 
Table A.3 Logistic regression results for adult recreation 
 Coefficient 
B 
Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Exp(B) 
Per-capita income 0.006 (0.067) 1.006 
Education 0.149 (0.098) 1.161 
Religiosity -0.037 (0.084) 0.964 
Non-religious group 
membership 
0.499** (0.214) 1.647 
Youth volunteering 0.221 (0.219) 1.247 
Latino -0.082 (0.348) 0.921 
African-American -0.331 (0.324) 0.718 
Age 0.003 (0.007) 1.003 
Gender (female) -0.566*** (0.202) 0.568 
Children in household 0.386* (0.224) 1.471 
Southern -0.334 (0.218) 0.716 
Constant -3.087*** (0.470) 0.046 
N 2087 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.046 
Notes: (Applicable to Tables A.3-16. Significant at one percent level ***, five percent **, and ten 
percent*. The results are weighted to account for the data set’s subsample of male and oversample of 
ethnic minority respondents. The sample includes only “charity selectors.” The reference category for 
non-religious group membership is no membership in a non-religious group; for youth volunteering, 
no experience in youth as a volunteer; for race, white; or gender, male; for children in the household, 
no children in household; and for region, the three other US regions - Northeast, Midwest, and West. 






Table A.4 Logistic regression results for arts, culture, and humanities 
 Coefficient 
B 
Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Exp(B) 
Per-capita income 0.190*** (0.049) 1.209 
Education 0.622*** (0.072) 1.863 
Religiosity -0.006 (0.061) 0.994 
Non-religious GROUP 
membership 
0.574*** (0.148) 1.776 
Youth volunteering 0.506*** (0.161) 1.659 
Latino -0.342 (0.300) 0.710 
African-American 0.271 (0.204) 1.310 
Age 0.015*** (0.005) 1.015 
Gender (female) 0.072 (0.149) 1.075 
Children in household -0.086 (0.166) 0.917 
Southern -0.415*** (0.155) 0.661 
Constant -4.510*** (0.361) 0.011 
N 2086 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.229 
Significant at one percent level ***, five percent **, and ten percent*  
 
 
Table A.5 Logistic regression results for education 
 Coefficient 
B 
Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Exp(B) 
Per-capita income 0.200*** (0.046) 1.221 
Education 0.302*** (0.056) 1.353 
Religiosity -0.009 (0.047) 0.991 
Non-religious group 
membership 
0.384*** (0.121) 1.468 
Youth volunteering 0.475*** (0.119) 1.608 
Latino 0.027 (0.191) 1.027 
African-American -0.010 (0.161) 0.990 
Age 0.003 (0.004) 1.003 
Gender (female) 0.536*** (0.117) 1.709 
Children in household 0.646*** (0.125) 1.908 
Southern 0.130 (0.114) 1.139 
Constant -2.946*** (0.277) 0.053 
N 2085 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.148 







Table A.6 Logistic regression results for the environment 
 Coefficient 
B 
Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Exp(B) 
Per-capita income 0.089** (0.043) 1.093 
Education 0.312*** (0.063) 1.366 
Religiosity -0.203*** (0.054) 0.816 
Non-religious group 
membership 
0.039 (0.139) 1.040 
Youth volunteering 0.250* (0.136) 1.284 
Latino -0.712*** (0.267) 0.491 
African-American -1.023*** (0.244) 0.359 
Age 0.005 (0.004) 1.005 
Gender (female) 0.488*** (0.136) 1.629 
Children in household -0.267* (0.148) 0.766 
Southern -0.199 (0.134) 0.819 
Constant -2.257*** (0.297) 0.105 
N 2085 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.114 
Significant at one percent level ***, five percent **, and ten percent*  
 
 
Table A.7 Logistic regression results for health 
 Coefficient 
B 
Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Exp(B) 
Per-capita income 0.121*** (0.043) 1.128 
Education 0.145*** (0.052) 1.157 
Religiosity 0.040 (0.044) 1.041 
Non-religious group 
membership 
0.538*** (0.114) 1.712 
Youth volunteering 0.366*** (0.109) 1.441 
Latino 0.025 (0.181) 1.025 
African-American -0.318** (0.153) 0.727 
Age 0.027*** (0.004) 1.028 
Gender (female) 0.453*** (0.109) 1.573 
Children in household -0.114 (0.120) 0.892 
Southern 0.005 (0.107) 1.005 
Constant -2.818*** (0.258) 0.060 
N 2087 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.147 

















Table A.8 Logistic regression results for human services 
 Coefficient 
B 
Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Exp(B) 
Per-capita income 0.103** (0.042) 1.108 
Education 0.181*** (0.051) 1.198 
Religiosity -0.072* (0.043) 0.931 
Non-religious group 
membership 
0.556*** (0.112) 1.743 
Youth volunteering 0.269** (0.107) 1.308 
Latino 0.088 (0.175) 1.092 
African-American -0.109 (0.150) 0.897 
Age 0.007** (0.003) 1.007 
Gender (female) -0.009 (0.105) 0.991 
Children in household 0.079 (0.117) 1.082 
Southern 0.150 (0.105) 1.162 
Constant -1.635*** (0.243) 0.195 
N 2081 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.074 




Table A.9 Logistic regression results for international/foreign causes 
 Coefficient 
B 
Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Exp(B) 
Per-capita income 0.023 (0.071) 1.023 
Education 0.206** (0.099) 1.229 
Religiosity 0.307*** (0.094) 1.360 
Non-religious group 
membership 
0.540** (0.217) 1.716 
Youth volunteering 0.611** (0.239) 1.843 
Latino 0.584* (0.325) 1.793 
African-American -0.104 (0.319) 0.902 
Age 0.010 (0.007) 1.010 
Gender (female) -0.118 (0.211) 0.889 
Children in household -0.393 (0.251) 0.675 
Southern -0.195 (0.215) 0.823 
Constant -4.698*** (0.513) 0.009 
N 2087 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.082 














Table A.10 Logistic regression results for non-family individuals 
 Coefficient 
B 
Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Exp(B) 
Per-capita income 0.027 (0.040) 1.027 
Education 0.084 (0.054) 1.088 
Religiosity -0.022 (0.046) 0.978 
Non-religious group 
membership 
0.200* (0.120) 1.222 
Youth volunteering 0.345*** (0.115) 1.412 
Latino -0.079 (0.185) 0.924 
African-American 0.510*** (0.147) 1.665 
Age -0.020*** (0.004) 0.980 
Gender (female) -0.011 (0.110) 0.989 
Children in household -0.106 (0.119) 0.899 
Southern 0.093 (0.110) 1.098 
Constant -0.402 (0.247) 0.669 
N 2081 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.064 




Table A.11 Logistic regression results for political organizations 
 Coefficient 
B 
Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Exp(B) 
Per-capita income 0.137*** (0.049) 1.147 
Education 0.179** (0.072) 1.196 
Religiosity 0.056 (0.064) 1.058 
Non-religious group 
membership 
0.624*** (0.158) 1.867 
Youth volunteering 0.776*** (0.173) 2.173 
Latino 0.039 (0.283) 1.040 
African-American -0.256 (0.239) 0.774 
Age 0.034*** (0.005) 1.035 
Gender (female) -0.591*** (0.153) 0.554 
Children in household 0.115 (0.184) 1.122 
Southern -0.012 (0.158) 0.988 
Constant -4.784*** (0.390) 0.008 
N 2085 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.157 







Table A.12 Logistic regression results for private and community foundations 
 Coefficient 
B 
Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Exp(b) 
Per-capita income 0.034 (0.058) 1.035 
Education 0.168** (0.085) 1.183 
Religiosity 0.053 (0.075) 1.054 
Non-religious group 
membership 
0.221 (0.188) 1.247 
Youth volunteering 0.598*** (0.199) 1.818 
Latino 0.312 (0.294) 1.366 
African-American 0.062 (0.257) 1.063 
Age 0.011** (0.006) 1.011 
Gender (female) -0.012 (0.181) 0.988 
Children in household -0.188 (0.207) 0.829 
Southern -0.137 (0.183) 0.872 
Constant -3.812*** (0.425) 0.022 
N 2086 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.041 




Table A.13 Logistic regression results for public/societal benefit 
 Coefficient 
B 
Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Exp(b) 
Per-capita income 0.085* (0.047) 1.089 
Education 0.355*** (0.077) 1.426 
Religiosity -0.197*** (0.067) 0.821 
Non-religious group 
membership 
0.509*** (0.166) 1.663 
Youth volunteering 0.553*** (0.178) 1.738 
Latino 0.369 (0.270) 1.447 
African-American 0.247 (0.225) 1.280 
Age 0.010* (0.005) 1.010 
Gender (female) 0.159 (0.163) 1.172 
Children in household -0.093 (0.181) 0.912 
Southern -0.079 (0.165) 0.924 
Constant -3.773*** (0.379) 0.023 
N 2083 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.100 






Table A.14 Logistic regression results for relatives 
 Coefficient 
B 
Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Exp(B) 
Per-capita income 0.122*** (0.041) 1.130 
Education -0.130** (0.050) 0.878 
Religiosity -0.075* (0.042) 0.928 
Non-religious group 
membership 
0.235** (0.111) 1.265 
Youth volunteering 0.216** (0.103) 1.241 
Latino 0.449*** (0.166) 1.567 
African-American 0.664*** (0.142) 1.943 
Age 0.002 (0.003) 1.002 
Gender (female) 0.257** (0.102) 1.293 
Children in household -0.105 (0.112) 0.901 
Southern 0.262** (0.101) 1.299 
Constant -0.676*** (0.231) 0.509 
N 2080 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.042 




Table A.15 Logistic regression results for religion 
 Coefficient 
B 
Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Exp(B) 
Per-capita income 0.064 (0.049) 1.066 
Education 0.189*** (0.065) 1.208 
Religiosity 1.215*** (0.061) 3.371 
Non-religious group 
membership 
0.043 (0.145) 1.044 
Youth volunteering 0.418*** (0.131) 1.519 
Latino 0.086 (0.209) 1.090 
African-American -0.409** (0.180) 0.644 
Age 0.034*** (0.004) 1.035 
Gender (female) -0.304** (0.130) 0.738 
Children in household 0.527*** (0.141) 1.694 
Southern -0.003 (0.132) 0.997 
Constant -3.464*** (0.311) 0.031 
N 2088 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.462 









Table A.16 Logistic regression results for youth development 
 Coefficient 
B 
Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Exp(B) 
Per-capita income 0.149*** (0.043) 1.161 
Education 0.108** (0.052) 1.114 
Religiosity -0.135*** (0.044) 0.874 
Non-religious group 
membership 
0.549*** (0.114) 1.731 
Youth volunteering 0.507*** (0.110) 1.660 
Latino -0.089 (0.180) 0.915 
African-American -0.045 (0.152) 0.956 
Age 0.004 (0.004) 1.004 
Gender (female) 0.166 (0.107) 1.181 
Children in household 0.521*** (0.118) 1.683 
Southern -0.071 (0.107) 0.931 
Constant -1.732*** (0.248) 0.177 
N 2083 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.099 




Table A.17 Descriptive statistics for all causes (means and proportions) 
 Arts 
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Notes: Statistics are for charity selectors, only. Standardized residuals are in parentheses.  


















































































































































































































































































































































































































               
Notes: Statistics are for charity selectors, only. Standardized residuals are in parentheses. Columns represent giving groups (e.g..column one indicates 
that 52% of people who gave to the arts gave to youth development.   
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